

ON THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER — In the months immediately following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan three years ago, most of the Afghan guerrillas battling the foreign enemy were armed with bolt-action rifles from the World War II era or even relics from the 19th century.

The tribesmen appeared to be fighting a romantic but doomed struggle, carrying little more than devotion to Islam onto the battlefield against a superpower. Lacking anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, they seemed to have little chance of triumphing over Soviet troops armed with the latest tanks and helicopter gunships.

Today, the religious ardor has not changed, but the weapons have. On a visit to Afghanistan with the rebels this past fall, the most common firearm seen among the insurgents was the Soviet-designed AK-47 Kalashnikov, an automatic weapon that is often called the world's best assault rifle. More important, most guerrilla bands now have several rocket-propelled grenade launchers, bazooka-like weapons that can turn a tank or armored car into a flaming wreck from 300 yards (about 273 meters) away. They have new mortars, mines and recoilless rifles.

The guerrillas captured many of these weapons from the enemy or obtained them from Afghan Army defectors.

But an increasingly important source of supply is from across the Pakistani border. The United States, China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have cooperated with the Pakistanis to guarantee a steady flow of infantry weapons to the insurgents, according to a variety of sources, including Afghan resistance leaders, senior diplomats and local officials in Pakistan, and West European military specialists.

The late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt provided the only public confirmation of foreign assistance, saying once that he had agreed to ship arms to the guerrillas.

Egyptian and European sources said the United States was paying \$20 million to \$30 million a year to Cairo, at least until the end of last year, to cover the cost of the arms going from Egypt to the insurgents. Since then, diplomats in Islamabad said, the new Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, seems to have reduced supplies to the Afghan guerrillas, perhaps to put some distance between his government and U.S. policies.

The increase in the amount and sophistication of weapons at the disposal of the guerrillas has probably been the most important factor in ensuring both the survival of the resistance movement and the escalation of the war over the past three years.

The arms supply from abroad has also provided the Soviet Union with a justification for keeping its troops in the country. Moscow says that its troops will stay in Afghanistan until all outside interference ceases.

The supply line to the Afghan rebels could be seen in action recently at the tiny frontier hamlet of Teri Mangal just inside Pakistan, a town of hastily constructed buildings, muddy streets and crowds of armed men.

There, scores of Islamic insurgents, who call themselves Mujahidin, crossed the border day after day carrying new Kalashnikovs with markings in Chinese or Arabic, or modified .303-caliber rifles made in Canada or the United States. Passing the deserted ruins of what once was an Afghan border post, they loaded mules, donkeys and horses loaded with a wide array of ammunition, grenades and heavier weapons.

A group of insurgents that I accompanied into Afghanistan waited three days in the nearby Pakistani town of Parachinar for arrival of weapons from Peshawar, headquarters of the Afghan resistance parties. The Mujahidin picked up their arms at a small office in Parachinar set up by the parties as a sort of distribution center.

A truck arrived carrying a variety of weapons of a sophistication not seen during a visit last year. There were 150 new Chinese Kalashnikovs with folding metal stocks; 300 khaki plastic-covered mines, also from China; 15 mortars, both a 4-inch type, of British manufacture, and a Chinese 82mm variety; four 82mm recoilless rifles; anti-tank cannons, each brand new, with Chinese markings; and 24 grenades.

Supplies of this kind reportedly have doubled or tripled since last year. The center at Parachinar is said to receive a truckload like this one every three or four days, and it is not the only distribution center.

Inside Afghanistan, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, recoilless rifles and mortars were much more in evidence than a year ago. Most of these relatively advanced weapons have come from outside Afghanistan.

The Soviet-designed RPG-7 grenade launcher, with enough power to pierce the armor of the standard Soviet T-62 or T-72 tank, has been the most important addition to the Mujahidin arsenal. Of about 60 guerrilla bands observed in the area south of the capital, Kabul, most were equipped with this weapon.

The guerrillas have proven adept at learning to use the RPG-7, which has given them the ability to go on the offensive against small Soviet forces.

During an ambush last year of a Soviet convoy on the Kabul-Jalalabad road, guerrillas accurately fired five RPG-7s and crippled all five vehicles — two armored personnel carriers and three trucks — in three minutes. That ambush illustrated that the resistance was capable of challenging Soviet control of the major roads, something that few observers had thought likely in December 1979, when the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan.

Resistance officials insist that they have purchased all these new weapons on the open market or from the local arms industry that flourishes legally in the tribal areas of Pakistan's north-west provinces. Pakistani authorities have denied Soviet allegations that they were supplying the Mujahidin with arms.

But Afghan, Pakistani and European sources told a different story. Resistance leaders acknowledge privately that they do not have enough money to pay for all the weapons they are receiving. And while it is true that Pakistan is not giving arms to the Mujahidin, it is the major conduit for funneling weapons to them in Afghanistan.

The sources said that a framework was set up to deliver arms from the four donor countries through Pakistan, the common motivation being the fear of Soviet expansionism.

The principal weakness of the insurgents is the lack of defenses against Soviet air attacks by helicopter gunships and MiG fighter planes.

Two journalists have seen guerrillas with a shoulder-fired SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile launcher. But despite reports to the contrary, the weapon is very rare among the insurgents. None of the groups that I visited around Kabul has ever had one.

Because of this, daylight operations in areas close to Soviet airbases are almost impossible, and there appears little doubt that the Soviet troops increasingly are using the gunship as the pivot of their counterinsurgency tactics.

Chronology... continued

2/28 - Reuters reports that several people were killed and many wounded in 3 bomb explosions in Kabul last week. The Soviet Army daily, Krasnaya Zvezda, reported the attacks and said that the bombs were set off in crowded areas of the city. Apparently Soviet press and tv are carrying unusually frank reports about the Afghan situation and have stated that guerrilla forces pose a serious threat to the Kabul government. The reports have also begun to mention the deaths of Soviet troops in action. (See p. 35) NYT

The Guardian 1/16

ISLAMABAD — Resistance fighters in a hide-out in Afghanistan once were bewildered to hear a radio report that their forces had attacked the second most important Soviet air base in the country. The broadcast said that the insurgents had poured gasoline into drainage ditches, set the fuel afire and triggered a series of explosions that lasted two days.

The report, which quoted "diplomatic sources" in the Indian capital of New Delhi, was not true. The anti-Soviet *mujaheddin*, or guerrillas, were not involved. A soldier at the base itself had blown up an ammunition dump to protest the appointment of a prime minister whom he did not like, according to resistance sympathizers working at the base.

Because of journalists' difficulties in getting first-hand information about the war in Afghanistan, media briefings by Western embassies outside the country have become a major source of data about what is happening there. The briefings are based on reports by Western diplomats stationed in Kabul, but the envoys there are severely restricted in their own information-gathering and acknowledge that there is no way to confirm much of what they pass on. As a result, reports about events outside the capital occasionally have proved to be highly inaccurate.

"You could almost say that the briefings have become a sort of new Five O'Clock Follies," said one disenchanted Western diplomat, referring to the U.S. military's 5 p.m. briefings in Saigon during the Vietnam War. "We're citing casualty figures which we have no hope of confirming or checking."

Precise information about Afghanistan always has been scarce, but this seldom was considered important before the Soviet invasion three years ago. The world suddenly wanted more data about the Soviets' first drawn-out military campaign since World War II.

The embassies' difficulties are illustrated by the handling of the accident that is said to have occurred in the strategic Salang Tunnel at the beginning of November. The story was broken by diplomatic sources and referred to deaths of 700 Soviets and 400 Afghans from asphyxiation because of fumes released in the tunnel following a collision involving a gasoline truck.

Resistance commanders and party officials in Pakistan, while confirming that something of importance had happened in the tunnel, said 400 people had died. The difference in estimates is noteworthy because resistance sources are widely believed to

inflate figures on enemy casualties. They are said to add at least one zero, reporting 100 dead instead of 10, for instance.

After the Soviets' Christmas Eve invasion in 1979 to combat a growing Moslem insurgency and to install Babrak Karmal as president, hundreds of journalists descended upon Kabul. They were not allowed to remain for long, however, and all foreign correspondents were forced to leave by the end of February 1980. With only occasional exceptions since then, visas have not been issued for Western journalists.

As a result, the only direct coverage of the escalating war has been by journalists willing to risk entering Afghanistan with a group of insurgents from neighboring Pakistan, where the resistance set up a capital-in-exile in the city of Peshawar.

The sheer physical and logistical difficulties that such trips entail, particularly for television, soon caused much of the initial interest in covering the war to fade. It takes four days of hard marching through the country's mountainous terrain to travel from the Pakistani border to the outskirts of Kabul. Journalists, including this correspondent, have continued to cross into Afghanistan with the insurgents, but the number is decreasing every year.

At this point, certain Western governments stepped in. Sensing that the war was in danger of disappearing from the general public's attention, they ordered their embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad to hold weekly briefings for the press about the state of the war as part of an effort to keep alive the issue of the Soviet intervention.

The briefings are based on the "sitrep," or situation report, sent by embassy staff still present in Kabul. The United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Australia — to name a few at random — still have foreign service personnel stationed in Kabul despite their refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Karmal government.

The briefings have become a weekly news event in themselves. The briefer lists armed clashes, disturbances in the cities and changes in government policy that have come to the attention of the personnel in Kabul. In a sense offering a pool report for the news agencies and correspondents who are barred from covering the events in person.

The diplomats in Kabul, however, are severely hampered in gathering information. They are not allowed to leave the capital, and the embassies are subjected to round-the-clock surveillance. Any Afghan who contacts a diplomat runs the immediate risk of being picked up by the internal security service. Kabul residents — whom I interviewed during the weeks that I stayed in the

area around the capital this year and last year — all said that it was not sensible to be seen near a Western embassy.

"It is the quickest way of getting yourself arrested," one resident said. Informed sources say that some embassies are worried about the security of their own employees in Kabul.

Diplomats who have served in Kabul acknowledge that they found it nearly impossible to speak to Afghans except for the ones employed by the embassy and, in one envoy's words, "when you're doing the shopping."

The Soviets and the government in Kabul also have taken care to minimize the number of experienced "Afghan hands" posted by Western governments to Afghanistan. Earlier this year, the State Department proposed to send Archer Blood, at the time stationed in New Delhi, to replace Hawthorne Mills as the new charge d'affaires of the embassy.

Accreditation for Blood was refused by the Babrak government, however, and it appeared likely that the refusal was because Blood had twice served in Kabul before. The acting charge, however, Charles Dunbar, served in Kabul from 1967-1970 and also has worked in neighboring Iran.

Given the restrictions imposed on the diplomats, they seem to do well to produce a report at all. The information collected about the situation in Kabul appears generally to be fairly accurate. Here the diplomats are in a position to see, hear and talk to at least one or two of the residents.

But, as I discovered on several occasions while inside Afghanistan, much of the information reported about what is happening outside the capital is inaccurate. I noticed that people from Kabul were much less critical than persons in the countryside of the accuracy of reporting by the British Broadcasting Corp. — whose Persian language service carried the faulty report of the "attack" on the air base.

The lack of reliable news about events in the countryside was brought home to me with a vengeance during my trip inside the country last year. In the middle of July, the Soviets launched one of their major offensives against the insurgents holding the Paghman region 12 miles northwest of Kabul. The fighting lasted three days, and the guerrillas held out despite being severely tested. Casualties were higher than ever, but the insurgents were proud of having forced the Soviets to withdraw in the end.

A few days after the attack, I was sitting with a group of eight or nine insurgents when a dispatch from New Delhi, again broadcast on the BBC, spoke of the offensive and said that all of the guerrillas had fled.

The reaction of the guerrillas was violent. One of the insurgents, whose brother had been killed in the fighting, stood up in a complete rage. Knowing that I had filed dispatches for the BBC, he assumed that the report had been mine and lunged across the room brandishing a brand-new bayonet.

Luckily, others intervened and forced him back, but again the dispatch had been blatantly incorrect. The same report picked up by the BBC was printed in hundreds of newspapers all over the world.

Privately, some diplomats in Islamabad admit that they feel the briefings in their present form are something of a farce.

"It is not the fault of the people in Kabul," said one envoy. "They're being forced to come up with as much hard news as possible — news that will get published. But it's a vicious, spiraling circle — the stories have to be better and better."

Despite this sense of unease, the briefings are unlikely to be halted.

That might just give Moscow the idea that we are easing up, and that's of course the last thing we must do," the diplomat said.

PANJSHIR FAMINE

As expected, the food shortage in the Panjshir Valley is critical.

French organizations are trying to send money to the area for the purchase of supplies.

The Afghanistan Relief Committee contributed \$70,000 to the effort.

If relief is not forthcoming it is feared that the residents will have to go to Pakistan, thus freeing Soviet troops involved in the area to operate in other parts of Afghanistan.

The war has seriously disrupted agricultural production but the output of natural gas, the main export, is to expand.

Islamabad: The virtual cessation of Western and Islamic states' aid to Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion three years ago has inevitably meant that the country has become heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. It is reported that Soviet non-military aid rose sharply from US\$34 million in 1979 to US\$284 million last year.

About 86% of Soviet economic aid to developing countries is devoted to four states: Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia and Afghanistan. A substantial proportion of the aid to Afghanistan is essential commodity assistance covering such items as wheat, rice, sugar, edible oils and textiles. Other aid from Moscow concentrates on sectors which increase Afghanistan's dependence on its northern neighbour and on projects which are either directly related to the Soviet military occupation or are of mutual benefit.

Examples include the maintenance and extension of the trunk-road system, the construction of a major road and rail bridge over the Amu Darya, expansion of existing airfields and development of the natural-gas industry. Others are prospecting for minerals and the building of a 220 kv. electricity line from the Soviet Union to Kabul, a line on which the country increasingly depends for its power.

The reorientation of the Afghan economy and its integration with the Soviet bloc is demonstrated by the fact that, according to official figures, the country is now dependent on the Soviet Union for 84% of its machinery and transport equipment imports, 65% of cotton fabric and 96% of refined petroleum products as well as all sugar imports. Official figures spell it out: over 400,000 tonnes of goods passed through the river ports to Hairatan, Sher Khan and Torgundi on the Oxus in 1981-82—an increase of 25% over the previous year.

Economic planning is largely under Soviet control and this is reflected in its priorities. Although agriculture employs more than 70% of the working population, the 1982-83 development plan, for example, gives priority to mining, industry and power in the allocation of resources (37.6%). Transport gets 27.4% and only 10.4% goes to agriculture. Afghanistan is primarily an agricultural country, but the war has seriously disrupted agricultural production. This in turn has meant a marked rise in food imports from the Soviet Union...Of the original 1,200 agricultural cooperatives organised by 1978, barely 100 remain this year on paper.

In a statement on October 15, President Babrak Karmal said that current annual food imports were 150-200,000 tonnes of wheat, 30,000 tonnes of rice, 17,000 tonnes of edible oils and thousands of tonnes of dairy products. Actual figures may be

higher: wheat imports are reliably believed to have increased from 100,000 tonnes in 1978-79 to 240,000 tonnes in 1980-81. The official newsagency, Bakhtar, reported in May that sugar imports this year would be 158,000 tonnes, up by 61% on 1981. Afghan sugar-beet production for 1981 was planned for 34,000 tonnes, compared to a pre-1979 figure of 100,000.

In the first 10 months of 1981, consumer prices are estimated to have risen by 37% and, according to at least one senior Afghan Government official who defected to Pakistan in May, prices had registered increases of up to 250% since the Soviet invasion. Electricity supplies are unreliable and inadequate, largely because of damage to power plants and transmission lines. In Kabul late this year, load-shedding was general and some areas were without power for 12 hours or more a day. In Herat, power was available for four hours every evening only, while in Kandahar the supply was almost non-existent.

Textile factories as well as cement works were either closed altogether or working well under capacity. Certain key industries manage to function because they are easily and well defended. Others are scattered and easily damaged or isolated. The exodus of skilled labour has not helped.

More than 70% of the country's trade is now with countries in the Soviet-led economic grouping, Comecon, compared with 39.5% in 1978. The Soviet share of this has gone up from 38% to nearly 56% and Soviet-Afghan trade is expected to treble between 1981 and 1985. During the current year some 62% of Afghan exports and 67% of all imports were conducted under barter arrangements with Soviet-bloc countries.

Natural gas is the single most important export. The Soviet Union is the sole customer, and about 95% is piped through to Soviet Central Asia. The Soviets have consistently underpaid Afghanistan for the gas in terms of average world prices," one analyst has recently been lieved to be about US\$12 per 1,000 cu. ms — low by world standards and less than the price charged by nian gas exported to Moscow for Siberian Western Europe.

In any case the earnings from the gas exports are notional in the sense that they are not paid for in cash, as the value of the gas is offset against Afghanistan's debt for imports and loans from the Soviet Union, now estimated at around US\$3 billion. According to Abdul Latif Aurah, former head of the gas and petroleum department of the Ministry of Mines and Industry.

Afghans cannot verify the amount of gas pumped because the meters are on the Soviet side of the border. Official figures suggest gas production for 1981-82 was 2.7 billion cu. ms, but production is planned to rise in 1983-84 by a further 3 billion cu. ms. Most of the high-quality urea fertiliser from the Mazar-i-Sharif petrochemical plant goes to the Soviet Union, as does the output from cement plants built by Czechoslovakia.

An economist who worked until recently in the Planning Ministry in Kabul has reported that in deals in which the country bought sugar in return for cement, the Afghans were losing US\$97 per tonne of sugar compared to world prices.

The Soviet Union also benefits from switch-trading in Afghan produce: fruit, olives, nuts, raisins and honey imported by the Soviets on favourable terms are then resold at a profit in Eastern Europe.

Afghanistan is short of the foreign exchange needed to buy goods on the world market. While official figures claim a surplus of US\$50 million in 1981-82, the country's foreign-exchange reserves are falling: from US\$375 million in March 1980 to US\$238 million at the end of 1981. Kabul is 'compelled' to ask the Soviet Union to buy goods from third countries on its behalf. The value of the convertible currency involved is then debited against natural-gas exports. Recent examples have been the purchases of soap from South Korea and cooking oil from Malaysia. A surplus of several hundred million rupees, which Moscow has accumulated in its trade with India, is to be used to buy a wide range of consumer goods for Kabul.

Moscow is also clearly interested in exploiting Afghanistan's considerable mineral resources: The iron deposits at Hajigak in Bamyan province are put at 1.7 billion tons of high-quality ore. The huge copper deposits at Ainak south of Kabul are also of high quality. High-grade chrome ore has attracted Soviet interest, while Soviet geologists working in Afghanistan have mapped out finds of uranium, beryl, barite, lead, zinc, fluorapatite, bauxite, lithium, tantalum and emeralds.

No precise figures are available for Soviet military aid, but the cost of direct military aid in 1981 has been assessed by diplomatic sources at more than US\$2 billion. Surprisingly perhaps, Afghanistan does not receive free military equipment as do Cuba and Vietnam. Values are comparable with these two countries, but the quality of the equipment is unequal. The Afghan client state is not trusted with the more modern equipment supplied to the two other Soviet allies, presumably because of the obvious danger of it passing rapidly into the hands of the ubiquitous resistance movement.

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War on a Shoestring

KEVIN LYNCH

IS'HAQ GAILANI hardly resembles a man with a price on his head. Gazing serenely at the sidewalks of New York, he appears comfortably at ease and at home. Gailani, however, is a stranger to New York and the United States. His home is in the Himalayas; his occupation is commanding a force of 100,000 freedom fighters in the Ghazni region of Afghanistan. Because Gailani is expert at what he does, Soviet authorities have promised \$40,000 to the man who kills him.

Less than five years ago, Syed Is'haq Gailani was studying politics and law at Teheran University in Iran. Upon completion of his studies, he intended to take his wife and daughter back to Kabul, where he would begin practicing law. But events there caused him to change his plans drastically. In 1978, the Soviets engineered a coup that resulted in the death of Afghanistan's President Mohammad Daud and the installation of Mohammad Taraki, whose most important qualification was his undoubted servility to the Kremlin. Shortly after the coup, Gailani returned home without his family, to join the resistance against the Soviet troops who were bolstering the Taraki regime. He was there, in December 1979, when the Soviets launched their full-scale invasion, pouring eighty thousand troops into the country.

Though the invasion caught most Afghans by surprise, they recovered with astonishing speed. "Fighting comes naturally to every Afghan," the thirty-year-old Gailani explains. "It's in his blood." Gailani's ancestors proved this to Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, and he and his countrymen have been proving it to Brezhnev and Andropov. Doing what comes naturally, the ragtag armies of *mujahedin*, representing various Afghan ethnic groups, took to the mountains and began waging a guerrilla war that has denied the Soviets control of

most of the countryside. When the Soviets launched their invasion, they had expected to overrun the country in a matter of weeks. They know better now, three years later.

Several months ago a defector from the regime of the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal—who succeeded Hafizullah Amin, who succeeded Taraki—claimed that as much as 90 per cent of Afghanistan was controlled by the resistance. More recently a Western journalist returning from a week with the resistance lamented that his closest brush with the Russians was a glimpse of the flashing

lights of a Soviet helicopter gunship. Gailani, with a smile that is very close to a taunt, volunteers to escort any visitor on a tour that will include every province of Afghanistan. Yet no one, least of all Gailani, denies the terrible damage the Soviets are inflicting on his country.

At the time the Soviets attacked, an estimated 15 to 17 million people lived in this Himalayan country, which is slightly larger than France. So far about four million Afghans—one-quarter of the pre-war population—have fled into neighboring Pakistan and Iran, earning them the melancholy distinction of being the largest group of refugees in the world. Despite the often harsh conditions in the overcrowded camps, however, they are far more fortunate than the ones who can't or won't flee—these have had to meet the attacks of the most powerful war machine in the world.

In Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union

THE EUROPEAN-BASED Permanent Tribunal of Peoples, meeting in Paris from December 16 to 20, 1982, questioned numbers of witnesses on Soviet activities in Afghanistan (freedom fighters, diplomats, doctors, scientists, refugees, newspapermen) and issued a 33-page report summarizing the testimony it had taken and condemning the Soviet Union for violations of international conventions on the Rules of War.

The Tribunal found that the Soviet Union had: a) used "prohibited projectiles" (dum-dum and poisoned bullets); b) murdered or summarily executed Afghan freedom fighters who had been wounded or captured, in an apparent "no survivor" policy; c) attacked villages believed to shelter combatants without regard to the safety of noncombatants, including old people, women, and children; d) set villages to the torch and destroyed crops and farm animals, causing the exodus of millions of refugees to other countries, "reaching major proportions since early 1980, which is to say after the Soviet aggression"; and e) sacked, burned, and destroyed the cultural and religious heritage of the Afghan people.

The Tribunal condemned these Soviet practices as incompatible with the Rules of War,

- ▶ which admit as legitimate only those attacks directed against military objectives;
- ▶ which protect the cultural heritage of a people;
- ▶ which protect, even in times of war, the elementary rights of those people who do not take direct part in the hostilities;
- ▶ which accord to hospitals a special protection. ("It has been established that even when well marked [with red crosses] these installations have been the object of attacks by the Soviet Union in total disregard of the Rules of War.")

The Tribunal also condemned "in this regard the contempt for human life revealed by the conduct of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. [The Tribunal] seeks to focus attention on the apparent correlation between the systematic destruction of villages and means of subsistence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the exodus of [nearly four million] Afghans. This expulsion of the inhabitants from parts of the territory that the occupation forces have not succeeded in controlling is in flagrant violation of the elementary rights of these people."

The Tribunal also regretted "the ease with which the United Nations, under the fallacious pretext that scientific knowledge is lacking, has backed away from its fundamental mission of inquiry and information on charges that chemical and bacteriological weapons have been used in Afghanistan."

Mr. Lynch is an executive editor at NATIONAL REVIEW.

slovakia in 1968, the Soviets were, in theory, coming to the rescue of fellow members of the Warsaw Pact, and thus were somewhat inhibited in their methods. Afghanistan, however, was an independent country—no holds were barred. The *mujahedin* have been given a display of practically every weapon in the Soviet arsenal, from land mines, to boobytrapped toys, to chemical bombs. Civilian casualties are now estimated at between half a million and a million. Hundreds of villages have been wiped out.

The Soviets, says Gailani, have used chemical warfare primarily in the northern part of the country, above the area where his own group of fighters operates, but Ghazni hasn't totally escaped. A report released by the State Department supports what Gailani says. About two hundred deaths in Ghazni province have been attributed to Soviet chemical warfare, while Badakhshan, the northernmost province in the country and the one closest to the Soviet border, has suffered some two thousand deaths. From 1979 to 1981, according to the State Department, over three thousand Afghans died in chemical attacks.

The Soviets also rely on more conventional weapons, including old-fashioned terror. They savagely punish Afghans towns suspected of aiding the *mujahedin*. When two Soviet armored cars came under attack in Kandahar, the second largest city after Kabul, the Soviets unleashed an artillery and air bombardment that killed several hundred civilians. When the bombing was finished, Soviet troops ravaged the city.

The Soviets treat their own side almost as brutally as they treat the resistance. Gailani says soldiers of the Afghan army, most of them press-ganged into uniform, are often forced to walk in front of the Soviet tanks; this way they either advance or are crushed to death. With few exceptions, in turn, any Soviet soldiers captured by the *mujahedin* remain only a brief time in captivity. Five captured Soviet soldiers are now in Switzerland, but it's not known whether any more will follow them. If resistance leaders had a reliable means of funneling their POWs to the West, they would undoubtedly take advantage of it, but they don't have the resources to keep prisoners in Afghanistan. "At least we just shoot our prisoners," says Gailani. "We don't torture them and then kill them the way the Soviets do with our men."

Confronted by an enemy that has an awesome advantage in weapons, if fighting weren't in their blood, the Afghans would surely have succumbed long ago. The press has carried many suggestive reports of weapons being smuggled to the resistance by the West, but Gailani dismisses them as greatly exaggerated. "When Sadat was alive," he says, "Egypt supplied some weapons," primarily old Russian arms, mementos of that country's days as a Soviet client. Since Sadat's assassination, however, that source has almost completely dried up. What arms the *mujahedin* have are usually obtained in one of two ways: from Afghans who defect from the steadily shrinking Afghan puppet army, or from Soviet soldiers who are captured or killed. It is for this reason that Gailani left his mountain redoubt to come to the United States. The resistance desperately needs weapons. "We are as determined as we ever were to defeat the Russians," Gailani says, "but we need help and we aren't receiving any."

Shortly after the fighting began, officials high in the Carter Administration started hinting that the U.S. was supplying weapons to the Afghans. The Reagan Administration has followed a similar pattern, flashing subtle signals, all of them off the record, that the Administration is doing its best for the Afghans. Gailani has heard plenty of such talk during his visit, but he has never seen any weapons. Perhaps resistance groups in other parts of the country have received some arms from the United States, he says, but Ghazni province, the area he is most familiar with, has received nothing.

GAILANI CAME to America with great expectations. He believed that once Americans learned about the war—about the chemical weapons and about the gaily colored exploding toys that have taken off little children's arms—they would rally behind the Afghans. But nothing he has learned on his trip encourages him to believe that anything will change. After two months in the country, he is returning to Afghanistan a bitterly disappointed man. "I am returning with empty arms."

The Afghans aren't seeking a single U.S. advisor. They are supremely confident that they can handle the Russians themselves. Nor are they asking for weapons as sophisticated as the ones the U.S. regularly lavishes on its allies.

What they need most of all are weapons capable of destroying the relentless Soviet helicopter gunships that constantly pound away at their mountain hideouts.

The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has been likened to the American involvement in Vietnam, but in Vietnam both sides were receiving support from abroad—at least until 1975 when the financial burden became too onerous for the U.S. Congress. In Afghanistan only one side has the advantage of foreign support. In addition to the Soviets, Gailani has seen Bulgarians, East Germans, and of course Cubans. Yet the *mujahedin* have more than survived. Can any guerrillas anywhere else claim to have done so much with so little?

The PLO, the guerrillas in El Salvador, and the Polisario in the Sahara have the good fortune to be on the Soviet side and so automatically qualify for generous comradely assistance. The Afghans, who are fighting Soviet soldiers as no one has fought them since the Second World War, get little more than moral support. However good they may be for the Western psyche, Olympic boycotts and temporary grain embargoes don't bring down helicopter gunships. □

NATIONAL REVIEW / January 21, 1983

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM COMMITTS \$95 MILLION TO AFGHAN REFUGEES

ISLAMABAD—The World Food Program (WFP) has committed a total of \$95 million for 1982-83 for the relief of almost three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The commitment follows an agreement for additional assistance of \$18.5 million announced here on December 15 by Mr. James Ingra, the Executive Director of the WFP who said Pakistan was the biggest recipient of assistance from the agency, receiving \$420 million since the program began.

During his six-day visit, which began on December 11, Mr. Ingra also visited several refugee tentage villages. He told a news conference in Islamabad on December 16 that he was impressed by the way the camps were run by the Pakistani Government.

The official also disclosed that the WFP had already delivered 500,000 tons of foodgrains to the refugees.

PAKISTAN AFFAIRS - 1/1

Pilgrims seek asylum 11/18/82

ISLAMABAD (AP via Xinhua) — A total of 1,500 Afghans on the way back from a pilgrimage to Mecca have sought refuge in Saudi Arabia and other countries, Afghan religious officials said on Tuesday.

The officials, Kazi Mohammed Qasim Mafteeh, chief of the pilgrimage department of the Religious Ministry, and his deputy, Brigadier Mohammed Ayub Mangal, themselves sought refuge in Pakistan and arrived on Monday.

In an interview with radio Pakistan, Mafteeh said that 4,000

Afghans went on the Mecca pilgrimage this year, of whom 1,500 stayed back in Saudi Arabia or other countries.

"All of them are seeking permanent refuge and asylum in several countries, but most still do not know which country will accept them," he said.

More than 20 people were reportedly killed in bomb explosions in three restaurants in the centre of Kabul last week in what Western diplomatic sources said was a dramatic increase of resistance activity in the Afghan capital.

Students called up

ISLAMABAD (Reuters via Xinhua) — Afghan puppet authorities have postponed university admissions for students to net conscripts for the armed forces depleted by defections and killings in the war against guerrillas. Western diplomatic sources said here on Tuesday.

The sources said the Soviet-backed puppet government was making frantic efforts to meet a recruitment target of 170,000 men by the end of the current Afghan year next March.

Main target of the latest phase of the recruitment drive are high school graduates, whose examination results were announced early

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this month but whose entrance examinations to university were postponed by the government.

The diplomats said they believed authorities wanted to use the interval to conduct a recruitment drive among the students before admission to university made them exempt from conscription.

Afghanistan had an estimated army of 90,000 men at the time of the coup in April 1978. But Western diplomats estimate its strength, reduced by defections, casualties and purges, is now about 30,000.

The sources said the Afghan army was annually losing 10,000 soldiers as deserters and 5,000 killed on the battlefield.

Attacks in Kabul

ISLAMABAD (Agencies via Xinhua) — The Afghan resistance forces have inflicted more casualties and material losses on the Soviet-Karmal troops in their intensified attacks in various provinces since winter set in.

In Kabul province, they assaulted a military post in Mohman Dara county on November 25, killing 14 Karmal troops and capturing two others. Two Soviet jeeps were destroyed and four Soviet officers killed in an ambush in Kabul the following day.

On December 6 in Samangan province, the guerrillas ambushed a military convoy consisting of large numbers of tanks and armoured vehicles.

Fifty Soviet-Karmal soldiers were killed and six tanks destroyed by mortar, rocket and gun fire. A helicopter gunship was shot down as the enemy conducted bombing in revenge.

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In Kandahar province, the guerrillas killed 14 soldiers and captured 12 others, including a major, in an operation in the first week of December. On December 7, they attacked a convoy near the Shor Andam area, destroying one tank and two jeeps.

In Washington, in a communique issued for day's third anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US President Ronald Reagan said that "three years after the invasion, the Soviet occupation is not a success."

"Even with the augmentation of their forces to close to 105,000 men this year, the Soviets, with the puppet Karmal regime, have not been able to control the countryside or secure many cities," Reagan said.

Kabul Blackouts

1/1/83 &

1/4/83

ISLAMABAD (Reuters via Xinhua) — Muslim guerrillas have badly disrupted electricity supplies in Kabul and some areas of the Afghan capital have been without power since Monday, according to travellers arriving here from Kabul.

The travellers also reported heavy firing in Kabul on Tuesday, the day after the third anniversary of the Soviet invasion. They said the shooting came from a number of sections of the city, including suburbs where Soviet advisers live.

The travellers, who asked not to be identified because of fears of reprisal on their return, said some embassies and businesses in Kabul were told by electricity corporation officials two days ago to use emergency generators because it would be some time before power was restored.

The travellers, who have proved reliable in the past, said there were conflicting reports about why the power supply was disrupted.

They said some reports spoke of a guerrilla rocket attack on the city's Pule Charke generating station in which a turbine was damaged.

These reports also said guerrillas attacked a hydro-electricity station at Mahipar in the Kabul gorge from which Kabul gets most of its electricity supplies.

However, the travellers said there were other reports that the guerrillas merely blew up power pylons carrying lines into the city.

Western embassies here in neighbouring Pakistan would make no comment on whether they had been advised of the electricity problems in Kabul.

Major Afghan guerrilla groups contacted by Reuters had no more details but a spokesman for the Mezbai Islami (Yunus Khalili) organization, which is heavily involved in fighting around Kabul, revealed that its members had planned attacks on the capital's electricity supplies to mark the anniversary.

The travellers said the anniversary passed off quietly until electricity supplies were cut on the evening of December 27.

However the travellers said this following evening after the 10 pm curfew the calm was disrupted by widespread shooting in the capital.

Most shooting came from the Darulaman and Khair Khaneh sections of the city. There are a number of Soviet offices and homes at Darulaman and a Soviet military base is located at Khair Khaneh.

ISLAMABAD (Xinhua — Agencies) — Islamic guerrillas attacked the Afghan defence ministry and the Soviet Embassy in Kabul on December 27, the third anniversary of Russian occupation, killing at least nine people, a guerrilla news agency claimed on Sunday.

The report by the Afghan Islamic Press agency, based in Peshawar, Pakistan, could not be independently confirmed.

If true, it would indicate that the guerrillas are striking with increasing deadlines in the mile-high Afghan capital.

The guerrillas also have said they had destroyed a power transmission line on December 27, plunging the entire Afghan capital into darkness. In another attack, they are said to have killed at least 16 Soviet soldiers at the Qasr-i-Chelak presidential palace on December 14.

The Afghan Islamic Press said the guerrillas attacked the defence ministry from the southern side, inflicting extensive damage and killing nine. It did not say whether the dead included Soviet advisers or of ficers.

Mortars, AK-47 submachine guns and 82-millimetre field guns were used in the attack, the agency said.

On the same night, another guerrilla group used mortars and rockets to attack the Soviet Embassy, inflicting severe damage and causing an unknown number of casualties, it said.

On December 28, guerrillas carried out an attack on the Soviet built Microroyan housing project where many Russian advisers and experts live, killing seven people the press agency said.

Earlier, Professor Khalilullah Khalili, Afghan minister of information and culture during King Zahir Shah's regime, said that Afghanistan would not rest content until they had liberated their country from the stranglehold of the Soviet invaders.

Economy of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan in shambles

ISLAMABAD (AP via Xinhua) — Three years after Soviet troops occupied the Afghan capital of Kabul, the city is suffering from an annual inflation rate of as much as 200 per cent, Western diplomatic sources here said on Tuesday.

They also said the value of the afghani against most major foreign currencies had dropped drastically and that the Central Bank in Kabul had resorted to printing vast sums of money without reserve backing.

Afghanistan's foreign reserves totalled \$656 million in 1980, according to official Afghan statistics disclosed by a West European diplomatic source. Foreign debts totalled \$1.14 billion in 1979, the last figure available.

Although the official exchange rate is 55 afghanis for \$1, the sources said the black market rate is now 85 to \$1, up 16 per cent from mid-November when dollars were being bought in city bazaars at 73 to \$1.

The present regime's buying up of large quantities of foreign currency to pay for major purchases is believed to be a major cause of the high inflation rate, said the sources, quoting latest dispatches from Kabul.

As evidence of this they cited the recent purchase of a 45 megawatt generator from a Swiss firm at a cost of \$22 million (about 1.54 billion afghanis). The unit is scheduled to go on line next winter, but its installation is unlikely to

remedy the problem of nightly power blackouts.

Afghanistan's hard currency problems are a direct result of the grass roots insurgency which flared after the Soviet military intervention there on December 27, 1979. Since then all trade has been with the Soviet Union. All transactions are made in rubles or afghanis, which are not accepted on international exchange markets.

The diplomatic sources also said that Afghanistan is facing widespread shortages of petrol and foodstuffs such as wheat and sugar. As an example, they said Kabul residents are now having to pay 70 afghanis, about \$1.20, for a seven-kilogramme load of firewood, more than twice the price a year ago.

Afghan president Babrak Karmal also has admitted his country is facing severe shortages. In a major address to traders on October 16 he said the situation was getting more acute each day.

To cope with the problem, he said his regime had imported more than 10,000 tons of wheat, 30,000 tons of rice, 10,000 tons of cooking oil and 1,000 tons of dairy products.

Among recent refugees who fled to Pakistan are two agricultural specialists who left Kabul because of the shambles that they said three years of war have wrought on the economy.

Karma, in Nangarhar Province, used to be called "Little America"

because of its fertility but now the area is barren, said Azam Gul, an agronomist specializing in wheat cultivation.

A colleague, Abdul Rahman Hashini, an agricultural credit specialist, said all agricultural projects have ground to a halt and that of 1,200 farming co-operatives established in 1978, only 100 remain on paper. "However, the government doesn't know who or where the farmers are," he said.

"The economy is an absolute shambles," he said, when he crossed over the border. "People have no work and no jobs because anybody that is eligible is being drafted into the Afghan army. Commodities such as oil, tea and sugar are four times the price they were last year."

Karmal's problems have been compounded by his government's policy of forcibly drafting all young males into the army, which has led to the emptying of factories and an exodus of workers from the fields.

The diplomatic sources on Tuesday confirmed that the forced draft by roving conscription gangs is continuing, leaving many high school graduates with the choice of being conscripted, fleeing Kabul or going into hiding.

They also said there were persistent rumours in Kabul that many soldiers drafted a year ago and due for release next month will be detained for an extra year of active duty.

"Three years of war have deepened our understanding and strengthened our confidence," Rabbani said.

He recalled that in the early days of resistance, the Mujahideen sometimes concentrated thousands of poorly-armed guerrillas to encircle and attack Soviet military bases. While they demonstrated an admirable undaunted spirit, they suffered heavy casualties. Now they have learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare and are better equipped, thanks to the weapons seized from the enemy. They destroy enemy military installations, ambush Soviet convoys and raid isolated enemy strongholds, inflicting heavy casualties.

Rabbani cited the Panjsher Valley battle as an example. Since last May the Soviet occupation authorities had mobilized tens of thousands of troops supported by large numbers of aircraft and tanks to seek and destroy some 3,000 guerrillas in the valley, which is about 80 kilometres northeast of Kabul. With mines, ambushes and other flexible tactics, the guerrillas succeeded in resisting the invaders in August. Freedom fighters attacked Kabul airport, destroying a dozen airplanes and an oil depot.

United forces

As to the different factions of the resistance forces, he said that they are becoming united in struggle. "This is progress for us," he noted. In March this year, three groups of resistance forces formed the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen. On May 7, other groups became united in an organization bearing the same name, which included Rabbani's Jamiat-I-Islami Afghanistan (Afghan Islamic Society).

Rabbani said, "We are facing a common enemy. We have common interests. The founding of a national leading organization is instrumental to defeating the Soviet invaders."

After suffering repeated setbacks, the Soviet troops have changed their tactics. They have ceased to mount all-out offensives. Instead they now concentrate their strength on operations in strategic places where the guerrillas are active. In these operations, Soviet aircraft destroy villages forcing people to flee their country and become refugees. But they have failed to wipe out the freedom fighters and, still less, make the Afghan people submit.

Rabbani said that the recent UN resolution adopted with an overwhelming majority and calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan shows the Soviet Union is politically isolated.

12/27 (Xinhua)

Michael J. Quaid, a Peace Corps Training Officer in Afghanistan & India from 1973-75, was killed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia where he was serving with the Peace Corps.

NYT 1/10

Resistance growing in Afghanistan

ISLAMABAD — "The Mujahideen (freedom fighters) can drive their carts in and out of Kabul while Soviet advisers have to travel in armoured vehicles or under the escort of tanks. This is the true situation in Afghanistan," said Burhanuddin Rabbani, a member of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen.

Rabbani, a noted professor, used to teach Islamic philosophy in the University of Kabul.

In an exclusive interview in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar, Rabbani briefed Xinhua on the developments in Afghanistan since Soviet troops invaded the country three years ago.

"What happened in the past three years prove that the Russians have miscalculated. They have failed to attain their strategic target in their invasion," he said. When the Soviet Union launched its massive surprise invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, many people had doubts whether the Afghan people, poor and weak, could withstand Soviet aggression.

ASIaweek reporter Anthony Davis, an Australian, entered Afghanistan on 8/11 and came out on 11/29/83. "During that time he walked hundreds of kilometers with the mujahideen, first to...Panjshir Valley, where most correspondents go, then far into the interior to Andarab, where he was given a horse... From there he rode with guerrillas to Mazar-i-Sharif and the Soviet border area." He communicated mostly in Farsi which he had learned while he was a reporter in Iran. In 1981, Davis spent 3 months inside Afghanistan. His article "The Truth About the War" appeared in the 1/29/82 ASIaweek. (and in Vol. X, No. 2 of the Newsletter).

The following articles appeared in the 1/14/83 ASIaweek.



Davis gives his boots a rest

Commander Rabbani is worried. He motions his men to join him around the communal evening meal of pillau and mutton. Head bowed, he mutters a brief prayer of thanks. The words are heavy with tiredness and despair.

On the face of it, the moustachioed former army officer has little cause for despondency. In the rich eastern Afghan valley of Andarab, he commands 2,000 guerrillas of the powerful Jamiat-e-Islami resistance organisation. Since it fell to triumphant rebels in January 1980, the valley, wedged between majestic, snow-dusted peaks of the Hindu Kush, has been hardly touched by war; the Soviet MiGs and helicopter gunships have been busy elsewhere. In the crowded bazaar, well-

fight another Muslim, has washed his hands of the whole affair. But Rabbani has ceased to count. As the fighting gathers its murderous momentum, he can only sit and listen to his command disintegrating by the hour.

For many, Andarab has become a byword for the unseen face of the war in Afghanistan — anarchic rivalries that are reducing the unity of Islamic forces resisting the Soviet occupation to a ragged facade. The valley is an extreme case, but not an isolated one. Over 1982 a continuing influx of light and medium weaponry reaching the mujahideen across the borders with Pakistan and Iran has raised the war against the embattled Babrak Karmal regime and its Soviet backers to its highest pitch yet. But as the

tempo of conflict has risen, so too has the fratricidal discord among resistance groups.

Just how badly fractured are the mujahideen? And what, or who, is behind the growing feuding? At the best of times, historians point out, Afghan unity is virtually a contradiction in terms. Since the first tentative steps to nationhood under ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-73), Afghanistan has always been a land of divisions and contrasts. Ethnically, it embraces a bewildering mosaic of Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras and Nuristanis. Religiously it is sharply riven between majority Sunni Muslims and a large Hazara Shi'ite minority. And, not least, harsh mountain and desert terrain has stamped on its diverse population a tradition of proud localism that has long resisted the imposition of central power.

That diversity is amply reflected in today's plethora of resistance factions. The first sprang up in the wake of the communist coup d'état of April 1978, the rest followed hard upon the Kremlin's ill-starred decision of December 1979 to prop up its foundering Marxist proteges in Kabul with massive military support. Their only real common denominator is a recognition of the primacy of Islam. To be sure, pressure from sympathetic Islamic states has sanded off the rougher edges of factionalism — on paper at least. In the Pakistani border city of Peshawar, nine separate Sunni parties have grouped into two rival alliances. The larger and stronger is committed to a fundamentalist Islamic





At left, mujahid on the lookout in mountain pass; Afghan children in anti-Soviet demonstration

armed mujahideen ("holy warriors") jostle with farmers, merchants and horse-traders. Business is booming. The valley is prosperous and free.

But Andarab is another reality, too. From across the darkened fields comes a long rattle of machinegun fire, then a crackle of rifle shots. The mujahideen, cross-legged around the glow of a hurricane lamp, pause in their eating and exchange wordless glances. Outside, Jamiat guerrillas are settling down to another night of skirmishing with Andarab's other resistance party, the Hizb-e-Islami.

Rabbani, who swears he will never



At left, Soviet air patrol over Kabul; insurgent-held town in central Afghanistan

republic, the other is composed of smaller, more moderate nationalist groups. But with Peshawar-based organisations exercising only loose control over events in the Afghan interior, guerrilla commanders enjoy sweeping independence — and the chance to pursue friendships and enmities that often have little to do with politics as it is played in Peshawar.

Suspicion between fundamentalists and Western-leaning moderates is endemic. But rivalry is at its most bitter between the two leading fundamentalist factions — the Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) led by onetime student activist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society) of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a soft-spoken scholar trained at Cairo's prestigious Al Azhar University. Tension is none the less for the fact both are members of the same alliance. "In fact," says one observer in Peshawar, "it's probably all the worse because of it."

Two years ago, analysts were generally agreed that Hekmatyar's predominantly Pushtun Hizb was the better-organised and wider based of the two groups. But since then indications are growing that Hizb's strong-armed revolutionary fundamentalism has been losing it friends in the staunchly conservative rural areas. At the same time, the more gradualist Jamiat, once identified with the Tajiks and Uzbeks of the north, has been moving to capture a broader,

countrywide support base that significantly includes Pushtuns. It has also produced some conspicuously capable and popular military strongmen.


Not surprisingly, the shift in strength has spelt friction — verbal and armed — that shows no sign of abating. In Peshawar relations continue frosty, if correct. In the interior, fundamentalist forces have clashed recently in northern Takhar, central Baghlan and repeatedly in the black-spot provinces of Parwan and Kapisa north of Kabul. "Hizb is getting to be about as big a problem as the

Russians," says Abdul Haiy, Jamiat's Baghlan commander.

The central Hazarajat, inhabited by the country's five-million strong Shi'ite minority, is another region where increasingly Muslim is killing Muslim. Last year, Shi'ite radicals inspired and armed by Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran have launched an apparently coordinated wave of attacks on their more conservative co-religionists.* Afghanistan-watchers are quick to note the Hazarajat was earlier one region of the country that under a "Council of Unity" had achieved a striking measure of internal cohesion and organisation. But as leading Hazara

commanders now turn to face the threat from the Iran-oriented radicals, the fast-spreading civil war is leaving little time for the anti-Soviet struggle.

The "new-wave" Hazara radicals, reports Correspondent Anthony Davis, are grouped in several parties — all, by Afghan standards, tight-knit and highly politicised. Moving fast to the fore is Saasman-e-Nasr (The Nasr Organisation). Other take their names directly from Iranian counterparts: Sepah-e-Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), Fedayeen-e-Islam (Sacrificers for Islam) and Hizbullah (Party of God). Nor is there much doubt where they have learnt their politics: "Our enemies are the United States, Britain, France and all the rest [of the NATO alliance]," one angry



*While most Hazara Shi'ites respect Khomeini as a religious figurehead, the pressure below on him to turn the role of political leader.

guerrilla brandishing an Iranian-supplied M-1 carbine told *Asiaweek*. "We don't want your help, your arms, your doctors. We know our enemies."

Afghanistan's "Shi'ite war" has ceased to be an affair of modest proportions. In northern Balkh Province, one round of fighting (between Saasman-e-Nasr and the conservative Harakat-e-Islami) last year saw casualties soaring to a conservatively estimated 400 dead. "It's still going on," shrugged one Sunni guerrilla leader. "These groups are well-armed now. What do you expect?"

Against this background, signs are that the Soviets are implementing a systematic and increasingly effective strategy of infiltration and subversion among the fragmented mujahideen. And that appears in turn to be linked to growing pressure on the rebels' civilian support base. Analysts concur that the

up bordering on straight genocide."

Given the constraints and the looming spectre of a quagmire of the type the U.S. experienced in Vietnam, Soviet strategy now appears to be shifting to a three-pronged thrust embracing political, economic and military elements. Indeed, the emphasis seems squarely to be on non-military means. "If you like," says one analyst, "they're making a virtue out of necessity. What's worrying is that it could be working."

Most strikingly on the rise has been infiltration of ill-organised mujahideen groups and the civil population of rebel-held areas. Kabul's East German-advised secret service, Khad, has one section, Department Five, devoting its energies exclusively to this end. Results suggest it has not been idle. Insurgent sources in central and northern parts of Afghanistan told *Asiaweek* that dif-

commander or rebel group is reported. Another favoured tactic: to surround a suspect village with tanks before dawn.

The prime lever for subversion and infiltration is cash, now being spent by Kabul in remarkable amounts to buy influence and individuals. As one senior guerrilla commander in Balkh put it: "In this country today, it's simply raining money." Economic pressure on hard-core rebel zones is similarly increasing. Following what in many areas was a disastrously poor 1982 upland harvest, withholding of imported wheat has led to spiralling prices, shortages and hardship for the civilian population. By contrast, in more tractable regions government troops have been distributing foodstuffs with some fanfare.

Civilians have also been harder hit militarily last year than ever before. In the countryside, stretched Soviet forces are reacting in an essentially retaliatory manner — usually against civilians in the vicinity of a rebel attack. Indiscriminate bombing and rocketing of villages is now standard procedure. Civilian morale has suffered correspondingly. In certain areas, *Asiaweek* heard expressions of war weariness that would have been unthinkable two years ago. Following a massive summer counter-insurgency sweep involving hundreds of civilian casualties, Logar Province, southeast of Kabul, was described by one informed Afghan source as "a disaster area for the mujahideen." Another black spot has been Shomali, north of the capital, where a Soviet offensive early in 1982 wrought havoc among the civil population. According to one senior guerrilla informant, fighters re-infiltrating the area later were not welcomed by the population. "It took us several weeks to restore confidence," he said.

Nor has the spectacle of insurgent feuding done much to enhance popular support. Said one angry merchant in Andarab: "These men spend more time fighting one another than the Russians. It's reached the point here where anyone with five men behind him reckons he's a 'commander'." He added: "I'm not against the mujahideen. But are these mujahideen?"

The resistance is responding sluggishly — where at all — to what has now become primarily a political rather than purely military threat. The crux of the problem appears to be deep-rooted in Afghan culture. "The mujahideen think almost exclusively in military terms," explains one analyst. "They see the war as a heroic clasp of men and arms. In undermining them politically and economically, the Soviets are hitting at exactly their blind spot."



Mujahideen displaying captured government spy: Infiltration is on the rise

Soviet military's biggest headache has been the size of force at its disposal for the task in hand. Statistics reflect the pressures: at the time of the invasion, 85,000 men were committed; by late 1981 that was up to 95,000, by spring 1982 to 105,000. Diplomatic sources in Islamabad now put the figure at 110,000.

Moscow's soldiers are backed by 35,000 ill-trained and unreliable Afghan Army troops. They are fully stretched by basic priorities — guarding bases and, in the daytime at least, cities and lines of communication. To "pacify" the countryside effectively, say analysts, at least four times the present number would be needed. "And even then," adds one source, "pacification would probably end

ferences between them had been brought to the boil by "hands of the government" infiltrated into their ranks. Often, they said, agents posed as army deserters, thousands of whom have joined the guerrillas. Kabul is also quick to follow up on rebel rivalries by offering arms to the losing side. Some mujahideen commanders reportedly have joined the Karmal régime well-paid militia outright and continue to enjoy considerable leeway to prosecute their private feuds, with government blessing.

Military strikes based on intelligence from spies implanted in the civil population also appear to be rising. In many provinces, mujahideen have been reporting capture of agents in possession of Kabul-supplied communications equipment — a new development. Typically, follow-up operations to agent tip-offs involve an air strike on a village where a

*The collapse of the Afghan Army, whose strength declined last year to an all-time low of 25,000 men, seems to have been checked by massive conscription round-ups. Among its present force, however, only 10,000 or so can be counted on to fight, say experts.

FROM THE EDITOR...

Our regular source of the Kabul New Times has not been receiving it. However we do see the Bakhtar News Agency cables which come to the UN Mission. We have included the information in them in the regular chronology and have tried to keep the literary style intact.

We appreciate our readers' calling our attention to articles and publications, events and projects concerning Afghanistan. Please keep the information coming as we want to include news from as wide a variety of sources as possible.

We sent questionnaires to every organization we had heard of with an interest in Afghanistan. A number are now unknown to the postal authorities; a large number responded. The list which begins on page 41 is based on the information provided by the organizations which responded. If your favorite organization is not listed (or even one you don't like very well), please send us the name and address.

According to Afghan press releases, the New Year was celebrated on January 1 in Afghanistan. Be that as it may, we take this opportunity to extend Nawroz greetings to those who still believe.

* * *

THE INTERNATIONAL AFGHANISTAN HEARING will take place in Oslo, Norway from March 13-15, 1983. The aim of the hearing will be to present facts and documentation on the situation in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. The Norwegian Honorary Committee of the hearing consists of representatives from all the political parties in the Norwegian cabinet. It is planned that 5 internationally recognized Afghanistan experts and 10 witnesses with personal experience in Afghanistan will speak and be questioned by a panel of Norwegian and foreign journalists and personalities. Bjorn Stordrange is the Chairman (Box 21, Sentrum, Oslo 1, Norway).

AFGHANISTAN DAY will be celebrated in various parts of the United States. Congress will issue a joint declaration on Afghanistan; President Reagan will issue a proclamation; a rally is planned in New York City on March 20 (Those wishing to participate are asked to be at Lexington Avenue and 67th Street at noon on March 20.); Boston plans an Afghan Day on March 20 with entertainment and refreshments; and the US State Department is planning a conference on AFGHANISTAN: PRESENT AND FUTURE sometime this spring. The State Dept. hopes to announce the date of the conference on March 21st.

* * *

A new film, AFGHANISTAN CAUGHT IN THE STRUGGLE, will be offered to Public Broadcasting Stations during the month of May by Amagin Films, Inc. The 30-minute documentary is narrated by Arnaud de Borchgrave and was researched and written by Rosanne Klass. Readers should contact their local PBS stations to find out the broadcast time in their area and to urge their stations to show the film.

* * *

"The Buzkashi Contest in Afghanistan - Game or Politics?" is the subject of a program sponsored by the Central Asian Circle on April 12 at 6 p.m. Whitney Azoy will be the speaker and the program will take place in Room 403 Kent Hall at Columbia University.

* * *

Three films, AFGHANISTAN, THE PAINTED TRUCK and NOMADS OF BADAKHSHAN, were presented at The Asia Society on March 9. The films were part of a series of films shown in conjunction with the exhibition "The Silk Road and the Diamond Path" on view at the Society until April 3. An 18-minute color documentary made by Maximilian Klimberg, "Mountain Crossroads, the Diamond Path," is shown several times daily during the exhibition. Hours are 10 - 5 Tuesday through Saturday; 10 - 8:30 Thursday; noon - 5 on Sunday.

With certain key exceptions, most notably the savagely battered Panjshir Valley, there has been virtually no attempt to organise the population behind the war effort. "Civilians are getting involved when they get killed or wounded," observes one critic. "In terms of giving them a role, an ideological incentive or a vision of the future, the mujahideen are doing nothing." There is, indeed, a dangerous tendency among many rebels to take popular support for granted. As some onlookers argue, the root of the problem ideologically stems from essentially negative goals: ousting the Soviets and the communist government. "Little positive thought has been given to the setting up of an alternative government, mainly because beyond saying it should be Islamic, no one is quite sure how to proceed," notes one analyst.

Moreover, the role of revolutionary fundamentalism as a binding force is tenuous at best. Noted commanders such as Panjshir's Ahmadshah Massoud and Mazar-i-Sharif's Mohamed Zabiullah, who see in bedrock Islam a potent revolutionary force, admit they must advance cautiously in the face of rural conservatism defended by influential but blinkered village mullahs. "We have our own ideas about these people," says Zabiullah. "But we cannot afford to alienate them."

Militarily, too, organisation among mujahideen is still weak, and has failed to keep pace with improvements in firepower. Antique weaponry has now almost everywhere given place to modern assault rifles, rocket-launchers, machineguns and recoilless rifles. But many units remain undisciplined volunteer groups composed of men of varying ages and military capabilities. "The notion that one man with a gun is as good as any other dies hard here," says one foreign observer.

But in both respects, military and political, the resistance's most intractable shortcoming remains its almost total lack of educated personnel, especially at mid-levels. The overwhelming majority of rebels have peasant backgrounds and minimal or no schooling. Average estimates among commanders were that between two and five percent of their men could read or write. Qasi Islamuddin, a Kabul University law graduate & top commander in north-eastern Afghanistan, frets openly about the ignorance and appearance of some mujahideen, whom he describes as "ashrar," the term used by the government for the "bandit" resistance.

Significantly, the areas that have displayed a capacity to organise and worry the Soviets have been "fronts" with a high proportion of educated men

and close links with an urban area. Notable, but by no means alone, have been Panjshir and the area around Mazar-i-Sharif, northern Afghanistan. Interestingly, too, the most effective fronts have emerged among the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara resistance rather than the tribally fragmented Pushtuns.

Analysts agree, however, that Kabul is aware of just where the danger lies and is anxious to prevent the lessons of rebel success from spreading. Massoud's Panjshir has become the most devastated valley of Afghanistan as the Soviets time and again hammered it from land and air. Guerillas' losses have been surprisingly light and the capacity to hit back hard remains. But the effect of Soviet bombing on the civil population has been difficult to counter: many have simply fled the valley.

As some critics see it, more dangerous than organisational weakness (which the mujahideen can overcome) is a central

military analyst put it: "The Soviets are not hurting badly. They are sitting or what matters and they can hang in for a long, long time." Tass, the official Soviet news agency, seemed to buttress that view by firmly declaring last week that Moscow's troops would remain in Afghanistan until "the external intervention" ended. The statement, which repeated a longstanding Soviet position, was widely seen as the Kremlin's answer to prevalent Western speculation that new Soviet supremo Yuri Andropov might be prepared to pull out because he purportedly opposed the Afghan adventure while head of the KGB.

Paradoxically, Moscow's continued presence may be just as well. Conversations with a wide range of guerillas and civilians in different regions of Afghanistan reflected a widespread uneasiness over the future. Many actually feared that a Soviet



Afghan civilians fleeing the war: A widespread uneasiness over the future

misconception prevalent almost everywhere in insurgent-held areas — that the resistance has time on its side. "We will fight the Russians for five years, for ten years, for one hundred years if necessary," blustered one 18-year-old in Baghlan Province. He spoke for thousands. At present the rebels' will to resist is not in question. What is in the balance is the length of time the rural population can sustain sledgehammer military punishment, economic hardship and the demoralising spectacle of fractiousness within the resistance.

In that respect, the indications from inside Afghanistan today are that it is Moscow that has time on its side. As one

pullout would result in either civil war between major Islamic insurgent factions or simply a descent into warlordism and anarchy once the Kabul régime had been swept away.

For the time being, the vast bulk of Afghanistan's people appears to remain with varying degrees of enthusiasm behind the mujahideen. But the trends of 1982 have been clear. As one Peshawar pundit put it: "The writing is on the wall." Whether the freedom fighters can learn to read it before it is too late is a big question mark hanging over the destiny of a turbulent, tormented nation. □

*Diplomatic sources in Islamabad put Soviet casualties after three years of war at 12,000, a third of them fatalities.

ODDITIES

Soviet *Mujahideen*

Ahmad Zia rises from his prayers, shakes out the light blanket that doubles as prayer mat and strolls over. He is plainly eager to talk. Conversation, in halting English, centres first on the death of John Lennon, moves to World Cup soccer, then to French film stars. For a *mujahid* in the barren mountains of eastern Afghanistan, the interests are improbable. But then for a *mujahid* the tall, Kiev-born 19-year-old who first came to Afghanistan with the Soviet Army, is improbable himself.

"Ahmad Zia" is one of a small but fast-growing number of Soviet prisoners and defectors who are today finding themselves trapped in Afghan rebel ranks — often with their guns pointing at former comrades. Two years ago, they likely would have been shot outright by their captors. Today publicity-conscious insurgent leaders are anxious to correct the "bearded fanatic" image of the *mujahideen* and to be seen as observing international codes of war — codes the Soviets themselves are disregarding, they say. Result: captives are staying alive.

Ahmad Zia was captured in mid-1982 as he jumped from his blazing tank during an ambush in central Baghlan Province. He was lucky. In the short, ferocious clashes flaring daily across the country, few Soviets are taken alive. Fewer still expect to be. Many fall into guerrilla hands while alone and off-guard outside their bases. "Faisullah," a young Tartar from the Ural Mountains, was overpowered by farmers while stretching his legs near his tank during a routine patrol of a peaceful area of Balkh. He was later turned over to the resistance.

Increasingly common, however, are conscripts fleeing the tough discipline that welds the ethnically diverse Soviet Army together — a discipline that, as several defectors told *Asiaweek*, is weighted heavily against Central Asians by a predominantly Ukrainian and Russian NCO corps. When Private Berik Bergibardi walked out of Kunduz air base two years ago after a beating from several officers, he'd had all he was going to take. Today, the 21-year-old Kazakh, renamed Taj-Mahmad, is a practising Muslim married to a local Afghan girl. Having personally knocked out more than a score of Soviet armoured vehicles, he ranks among the most celebrated guerrillas of northern Afghanistan. He is not interested in going home.

Abdul Khaluk, a cheerful one-time circus hand from Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, had a similar tale. He had fled to the *mujahideen* after a brawl with a drunken Soviet officer. The officer came off the worse. Today, the 22-year-old fights alongside fellow Tajiks in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. He was quite happy, he told *Asiaweek*, and hoped one day to go

*He never revealed his real name

home — to carry the Islamic revolution back to Tajikistan.

Generally, the Central Asians adapt well to life with the guerrillas. Soviet Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen troops often find they speak the same language as their captors. And in most cases, they are only one generation removed from the Islamic faith. Before long they are accepted — and armed — by the rebels.

For European Russians the going is much tougher. The language barrier is daunting. Then there is the religion: out of fear many agree to convert to Islam, which the Afghans are only too happy to see as a "genuine change of heart." From there, though, it is a short step to the "suggestion" they should defend the faith against godless communism — and their former comrades. In northern Afghanistan, *Asiaweek* learnt of one Russian who had converted to Islam and been with the guerrillas three months. But on a journey to Pakistan while passing near a Soviet base, the temptation proved too much and he made a break for it. He was recaptured and executed.

What chance do Afghanistan's invaders-turned-*mujahideen* ever have of going home? Better than nil, though not very much. The major breakthrough came in December 1981 with an agreement between most Peshawar-based resistance parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It stipulated that ICRC officials should have the right to interview Soviet captives, who could either choose a period of two years' internment in Switzerland and then return home or, if they really wished, remain with the *mujahideen*. So far, seven Soviets have left Pakistan for Swiss internment. But even as the dimensions of the problems grow, its solution is breaking down. The ICRC does not know how many Soviets are with the rebels, voluntarily or otherwise. But it is sure a growing number is not reaching them for interviews as agreed.

On their side, the Afghans are openly unhappy that the ICRC has failed in its stated objective to secure the release of rebels held by the Kabul régime. "This has just become a one-sided agreement," said one party leader. "We haven't formally cancelled it, but we feel the parties are losing interest fast." An ICRC team did visit the Afghan capital last autumn to begin documenting detainees held in Kabul's infamous Pul-i-Charkhi jail. But its visas were not extended and it was forced to leave. Despite optimism in Red Cross circles, there is as yet no indication they will be allowed back — and even less that Kabul is ready to release anyone.

The Afghans are now falling back on the hardly convincing line that none of their prisoners wish to return to the Soviet Union, so there is no reason to produce them for interviews. As for Ahmad Zia, having made his commitment to Islam, he's now stuck with it. And in Baghlan these days, there's little time for rock music or soccer. □




Prisoner Faisullah



Ahmad Zia at prayer: Shooting at ex-comrades

PHOTOS: DAVIS — ASIaweek



Insurgents examining rocket-launcher: No threat to Moscow's underbelly

MISCONCEPTIONS

The KGB Sleeps Easy

When a major Western broadcasting company reported early last year that *mujahideen* guerrillas had crossed the Oxus River to attack the Soviet border city of Termez, Afghanistan watchers' pulses began beating a little faster. The assault, as the account had it, involved 300 rebels, supported by the local population on the Soviet bank. They took no casualties in the fighting and retreated back over the river in good order. The Islamic resistance was, it seemed, carrying its war decisively into the Soviet Union's soft Muslim underbelly.

The report was also instructive, for when *Asiaweek* followed it up on the ground, none of the rebels operating along that stretch of the Oxus knew anything about it. No, they said, they had never attacked Termez, and as far as they knew no one else had either. Perhaps there had been a raid somewhere else...

The "Termez assault" is just one instance of the sort of misreporting from Pakistan of events along the Soviet-Afghan border that has more to do with Afghan — and Western — wishful thinking than facts. It is far from an isolated case. As one Peshawar pundit sardonically noted: "Mujahideen crossing the border and Islamic revolution in the Soviet Muslim republics is getting to be every right-wing Westerner's wet dream."

How much does Moscow have to fear spillover from its Afghan adventure into its own admittedly sensitive Muslim "deep south"? If events on the border itself are any yardstick, not much. Indeed, with Soviet ground and air forces now crossing the Oxus at will from secure bases in the southern U.S.S.R., the frontier has become something of a cartographic nicety. For guerrillas operating along it, the war is, if anything, more hazardous than elsewhere in Afghanistan. "We have our heads right in the tiger's mouth," says Abdul Jabbar, leader of 400 Turkmen guerrillas in the border district of

*The U.S.S.R.'s 43 million Muslims, most of whom are clustered in areas bordering Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and China are expected to make up a quarter of the Soviet population by the year 2000. In recent years official Soviet sources have conceded a growth in the "criminal, subversive, anti-social activity of the sectarian underground and the reactionary Muslim clergy."

Kaldar. Near the Afghan town of Heiratan and the twin Soviet city of Termez, the district is flanked on one side by the river and on the other by arid desert stretching to the south.

The tiger is uncomfortably visible. Three hundred metres across the muddy, turbid waters of the Oxus are the watchtowers, guard posts and armoured vehicles of the KGB's special border patrol units. "We live under Russian guns 24 hrs a day," said one guerilla as he went to the river's edge. The Soviets are at pains to ensure the point is not forgotten: opposite the straggling village of Kohna Kaldar they have set up a firing range. Peasants on the Afghan bank till their fields to the staccato hammer of machineguns as the men of the KGB sharpen up their skills across the water.

Like most in Kaldar, Abdul Jabbar's family are refugees from the ancient emirate of Bokhara, absorbed into Soviet Uzbekistan in the 1920s. But though memories of life — and of Muslim resistance — in Bokhara linger on, no one today is in a hurry to return. "We don't know the terrain over there or how much support we could count on," says Jabbar. "And," he adds with a grim smile across the river, "they're probably waiting for us."

Kaldar's guerrillas do occasionally attack Soviet shipping on the river and, more frequently, military convoys heading south across the desert from the new Heiratan road bridge. Shipping, says Jabbar, has dropped off sharply since the war started. "But we never make any attacks near the villages," he admits. "One shot across the river from here and the Russians will bombard us for hours."

Undeniably, however, Afghan rebels have crossed into the Soviet Union from provinces further east — Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan — where the Oxus is shallow and less broad. A wide range of on-the-spot reports indicated the rebels had crossed using inflated sheep skins or motor tyres. But mostly, the nighttime raids appear to have been little more than lightly politicised cattle-rustling expeditions. And cattle-raiding, as one Peshawar-based analyst points out, "has been going on for centuries anyway."

Indeed, as some guerilla commanders see it, the crossings are not only small beer but quixotic distractions. Says Mohamed Zabiullah, the popular 28-year-old leader of rebels in northern Balkh: "There are commanders who think in a few years they'll be making Islamic revolution in Bokhara. What they don't realise is if they can't unite among themselves, their men will be deserting them here — forget about crossing into Russia."

Nor is Zabiullah — a former teacher of Islamic studies who still has a grandmother in Soviet Uzbekistan — optimistic about prospects for the growth of Islam as a political force in the southern Soviet republics. Cross-border contacts with sympathisers exist, he says, but "people over there understand little about Islam. There is no religious missionary work, no Islamic colleges. We send over some Korans but our texts are in Persian or Arabic script, which people under 50 over there can't even read."

For the time being at least, unlike their compatriots bogged down inside Afghanistan, the men of the KGB along the Oxus do not appear to be losing much sleep.



Cmdr. Zabiullah

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

AN ATLAS OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE by Irfan Habib of Aligarh Muslim University. Oxford University Press, 1982. 120 pp. \$69.00. "Each region of the sub-continent is covered by separate political & economic sheets drawn to a uniform scale and accompanied by detailed notes on the historic geography of each region." Political and Economic maps with detailed notes, bibliography & index.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1982 contains over 3 pages on Afghanistan. (Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF, U.K. \$6.95)

WE ARE ALL AFGHANISTAN by Hans Graf Huyn, Institute of American Relations & The Centre for a Free Society, Washington, D.C., 1980. \$2.00 (325 Constitution Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.)

HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN by Yuri V. Gankovski, Mysl, Moscow, 1982. In Russian, 20,000 copies printed. Afghan history to 1981.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN edited by M.R. Arunova, Nauka, Moscow, 1981. In Russian, 50,000 copies printed.

UNDER THE SKIES OF AFGHANISTAN by Timor Gaidar, Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moscow, 1981. In Russian.

THE SIMON & SCHUSTER BOOK OF ORIENTAL CARPETS, Giovanni Curatola, trans. by Simon Pleasance, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1982.

THE ROAD TO KABUL, an anthology by Gerald de Gaury & H.V.F. Winstone, Macmillan, New York, 1982. 233pp., maps. \$15.95. "The authors have created what they call a 'political-literary-geographical montage' that places present tensions and power struggles in a vital historical perspective, providing reports on early wars of conquest and on the long dispute between imperial Britain and Czarist Russia." (fly-leaf)

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD TURKEY, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Praeger Publishers, 1982. 200 pp., \$22.95 (paper \$11.95).

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, New York, Praeger, 1982. 230 pp. \$26.95 and THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: THE EVOLUTION OF AN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, New York, Praeger, 1982. 167 pp. \$21.95 (paper \$10.95).

THE AFGHAN SYNDROME: HOW TO LIVE WITH SOVIET POWER, Bhabani Sen Gupta, New Delhi, Vikas, 1982. 296 pp. (Advent Books is the US distributor; the price is \$37.50.)

SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY AFTER AFGHANISTAN by G.S. Bhargava, Lexington Books, 1982. 208 pp. \$23.95.

"India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan" by Amaury de Riencourt in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1982/83. Pp. 416 - 437.

REVOLUTIONARY AFGHANISTAN: A REAPPRAISAL, Beverley Male, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 229 pp.

AFGHANISTAN: THREE YEARS OF OCCUPATION by Eliza van Hollen. Special Report #106, US Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20520. 12 pp. December 1982. (Excerpts appear on p.36)

"Afghanistan: Transforming Tradition" by Marilyn Bechtel in THE NEW WORLD REVIEW, Vol. 50. #6, Nov.-Dec. 1982.

MEMORIES OF AFGHANISTAN by M.H. Anwar, Carlton Press, 1981. 240 pp., \$8.95. A review of the book by Marilyn Berger appears in THE NEW WORLD REVIEW, Vol. 50, #6.

AFGHANISTAN IN PICTURES compiled by Vladimir Ashitkov and Yuri Golovyatenko, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1982. (English text).

"Social Structure and the Veil in Afghanistan" by Jon Anderson in ANTHROPOS, Vol. 77, 1982. Pp. 397-420.

CULINARY NOTES

Afghanistan Cuisine, the restaurant at 2727 Fondren in Houston, Texas, has been sold to an Iranian. He has changed the name to KHAYYAM but he will cook Afghan food on request.

CARAVAN SERAI is an Afghan restaurant at 50 Paddington Street in London. Open from noon to 3 p.m. and from 5:30 to 11:30 p.m., it offers "excellent food that will magic you back to Afghanistan.." Tel. 01-935-1208 for the magic.

The CARAVAN SERAI, 2046 Pinehurst Ave. at Cleveland St., ~~St.~~ Paul, MN (612-457-8476 or 612-698-9941) has been serving Afghan food there since 1972. It has a western room, an Afghan room with pillows and low tables and a private room for parties.

For those planning Nawroz parties, here is a recipe for dried fruit compote (Mayway No'wrozée) adapted from AFGHAN COOKERY by Doris McKellar, published in Kabul in 1967:

Wash and place in a bowl
2 cups dried apricots
2 cups dark seedless raisins
1 cup light raisins
2 cardamom pods

Cover with cold water to about 2" above the fruit; set aside for two days.

In another bowl place
1 cup walnuts
1 cup pistachio nuts
1 cup blanched almonds

Cover with water as above and set aside.

As the skins (not the shells, the skins! You should have shelled the nuts) soften they should be peeled. (This is messy)

After two days of soaking, combine the fruits and nuts (with the liquid) and add ½ cup of drained red maraschino cherry halves.

To serve, spoon fruit, nuts and some of the juice into dessert dishes. This recipe makes a lot so you may want to divide or quarter it. Happy New Year.....

RECENT PUBLICATIONS... continued from p.23

REFUGEES MAGAZINE, January 1983, is devoted to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The magazine is published by the Public Information Section of the UNHCR and copies are available from UNHCR, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland.

THE BALUCHIS AND PATHANS by Robert G. Wirsing, Minority Rights Group Report #48, London. 23 pp.

AFGHANISTAN: PAST AND PRESENT edited by E. Shchepilova et al., Moscow USSR Academy of Sciences (Oriental Studies in the USSR #3), 1981. 271 pp. 1 ruble. (A review by Thomas Perry Thornton appears in the JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES, Vol. XLII, No. 2, February 1983.)

Articles by Rosanne Klass appeared in the 12/29 LOS ANGELES TIMES and the 1/24 WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Rosanne is the guest editor of the winter issue of WORLD AFFAIRS, published by the American Peace Society and the Heldref Foundation (4000 Albemarle St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016). The issue will include articles by Leon Poullada and Abdul Tawab Assafi, a former minister of mines.

"Afghanistan; A War Without End" in TIME, 1/10; "The Afghans' Trail of Misery" in NEWSWEEK, 1/10; "Soviets in Afghanistan: No Easy Way Out" in US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 1/3; "Too much at stake to quit" and "A short, dangerous walk in the Soviet Kush" by John Fullerton in the FEER, 12/24; "Moscow's funeral diplomacy" by Richard Nations in the FEER, 12/24; "Russia in Afghanistan" in THE ECONOMIST, 1/8. Excerpts appear on p.29.

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN: WILL THEY GO HOME AGAIN by Allen K. Jones for the US Committee for Refugees (20 West 40th St., New York, NY 10018), December 1982.

AFGHANISTAN'S TWO-PARTY COMMUNISM - PAR-CHAM AND KHALQ by Anthony Arnold, Hoover Institution Press, 1983. (due in June)

A LETTER FROM PAKISTAN.....

(The following is a translation of a letter written by "Mahmadajan," the pen name of an Afghan currently living in Pakistan.)

"Lala is good at sword play, Abdulla at eating" ... Pushto proverb

Early last year when Joe de Cola was shooting the early scenes of his movie for American television we happened to come across each other in the Jadran Valley one morning. He was interviewing Sher Mohammad Khan of Jadran who told him about the cemetery of Russian tanks in Seta Kandau. At one point, while discussing the types of weapons the Mujahideen were using, the Khan complained: "I don't understand this: the fighting is here and the arms assistance goes to Pakistan. Is America arming Pakistan to fight the war for us or are you preparing Pakistan to fight us tomorrow when we have accepted a communist government?"

I never got to see that movie but the Khan's remarks still nag my conscience. Many Afghan refugees in Pakistan have the same misgivings, yet dare not express them. No one begrudges Pakistan's good fortune, but that it should come at the expense of another country which is fighting for survival has saddened many, in fact all Afghans who do not see Afghanistan as a lost cause.

One must admit that Pakistan has its own problems. One must also concede that the Afghan situation has compounded those problems. However, by the same logic, Afghans have their own problem, a more pressing and significant one at that. The problems of these two countries are distinct from each other however parallel they might be. For example, one man, General Zia, has a problem with his martial law; political parties have a problem coalescing against him; the Baluchis have a problem making themselves heard; etc., etc. We, on the other hand, do not have these fragmentary problems; ours is total and that is the survival of Afghanistan as an independent nation. Afghans love the General Sahib, but they do not think that Pakistan would disintegrate with his fall. Our problems are not interwoven as some people are misled to believe. We did not create Pakistan's problems. Generals have come and gone in Pakistan before the catastrophic Afghan coup of 1978 and Bhutto was not hanged for our sins. Likewise, it was not Pakistan that brought calamity to the Afghans. It is the KGB propaganda, voiced by Kabul Radio, which claims that the present crisis is masterminded from the outside - from Pakistan. Our problem is simple and straightforward: The Russians have invaded our country and installed a puppet regime. The only solution is that the Soviets withdraw and take their puppet regime with them. All other utterances in this regard are confusing the issue.

Among the Afghans in general the following complaints are whispered (and I use whispered because they have no independent mass media at their disposal and they also fear arrest and/or deportation by the CIDs with which the whole refugee area is teeming):

-- Pakistan is using the Afghan issue to solve its own financial problems. It claims that the refugees are costing \$1m per day. The fact is that Pakistan is spending only a fraction of the international assistance it receives. Most of the refugees have been living off the money and household items which they brought over the border. Some are even now regularly drawing money and goods from their home towns inside Afghanistan. A few refugee camps such as the one at Nasser Bagh have been built as show cases where distinguished visitors and prospective financial sources are taken. Only these show case camps receive the \$5 monthly allowance as claimed by Pakistan. The number of refugees in these camps is less than 5% of the total number of Afghans in Pakistan. The tube well network project, the permanent school building construction, the cottage industry projects and a multitude of other development schemes are being financed from this international

assistance under the pretext of aid to the Afghan refugees. In her efforts to take optimum advantage the Pakistan Government resorts to vile means such as squeezing the UN Drug Abuse Control (UNADC) out of a few bucks by blaming drug trafficking on the Afghan refugees. Offices have cropped up under fictitious names where Pakistani citizens are paid six to ten times the local salary scale from funds designated for Afghan refugees. No Afghan is permitted to work in these offices even when the business involves direct dealing with refugees. A by-product of this segregation has been the flight of qualified Afghans such as doctors and engineers to Europe and America. When about 1,000 Afghan teachers formed an association of Afghan teachers for Afghan Refugees, Pakistan dissolved it through subtle manipulation.

- - Pakistan is perpetuating the Afghan crisis for her own interests. The basic pattern here is common both to Pakistan and Iran. Both countries are trying to gloss over the Afghan freedom movement and brand it as an Islamic Revolution. Iran, of course, does this with less tact and subtlety by disassociating herself from the Afghan cause altogether and by giving lip service to a very minor Shia movement. Pakistan uses a more sophisticated method, hence it is more destructive. Pakistan supports the leadership of the Hezbi-i-Islami, a sub branch of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, the only party that supports the military regime. Out of a multitude of Jihad and political resistance groups formed by Afghans to counter the communist challenge, Pakistan recognizes only six. Among these, the three moderate groups, even when they are led by religious figures, are under constant harassment and pressure by the three fundamentalist groups which have the blessing of the Jamaat Islami of Pakistan and the government. The fundamentalists have a virtual monopoly over the lives of the refugees, the mass media and other facilities of the Pakistan Government. These groups are permitted to speak for Afghanistan on local as well as international forums. The most militant of these, led by Hekmatyar, maintains a virtual government within a government. It has its own court, training areas, safe houses, jails and a special brigade for arresting, interrogating, torturing and executing those elements it considers a threat to its hegemony. Its flag flies high on the refugee camps. The functionaries of this group make speeches and, in the garb of ordinary refugees, have the privilege of conversing with foreign visitors...

We Afghans believe that this is a war of liberation we are fighting and not an Islamic Revolution. Pakistan and Iran are taking advantage of the fact that the people of Afghanistan are devout Moslems. This provides them with a pretext to falsify our historic national consciousness and our identity as a freedom loving country. By her patronage of the fundamentalists, Pakistan not only nurtures the hatred of the bulk of the Afghan fighting force and the refugees, but she also denies the Afghans the option of an acceptable alternative to the Karmal regime, which is a prerequisite for any Soviet withdrawal. No self-respecting country, let alone an historically expansionist, stubborn superpower such as Russia can tolerate an irresponsible, unharnessed, fanatic state in her neighborhood. Add Islamic fanaticism to the hatred the Afghans will bear toward the Russians for generations and you have literally a powder keg along the 1,000 mile border with the Soviet Union.

Contrary to Soviet claims, the Afghans are not fighting against progress but for it. The Afghans are not reacting to a progressive regime, but responding to a decaying colonialistic idea. Contrary to Soviet claims, Afghanistan was not an illiterate, poverty-stricken nation. Almost every village had its own school with a total enrollment of more than 1 million. True, we were not as advanced as we might have been but we were moving in the right direction with firm steps. We were self-sufficient in food production - which is more than Russia can claim for herself.

I want to recall once again what Sher Mohammad Khan of Jadran said to Joe de Cola. The Afghans demand that Pakistan and other well-wishers not meddle in the internal affairs of the Afghans as we have no wish to interfere in theirs. Any helping hand extended to us ought to serve our interests first and foremost. It so happens that our interests run parallel to those of the rest of the free world only so far as thwarting Soviet ambition. Let us work side by side that far and leave the rest to the people of each nation themselves. Recently we heard on VOA that 80 lorries had been given to Pakistan for Afghan refugees. I hope some inquisitive researcher can go to Pakistan to trace the destiny of these "yellow Rolls Royces."

By Edward Girardet

Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Paris

"The radio you have brought us is worth more than a thousand Kalashnikovs," the partisan commander told French human rights activists in late August 1981.

Barely 15 months have elapsed since its first clandestine broadcast in Kunar Province on that warm summer evening, yet Afghanistan's Radio Free Kabul (RFK) has grown into more than just a vexatious burr for the Soviets.

Supported by a small group of European human rights activists and exiled Soviet dissidents, RFK now has 11 resistance-run radio transmitters (10 FM and one shortwave) in various provinces. The eventual goal is to install a network of 36 stations to cover the entire country. Compact and easily transportable because of the need to avoid communist detection, at least one of the 15-pound FM transmitters has been established within a 50-kilometer radius of the Afghan capital.

Similar to the haunting "V for victory" signal from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony used by Radio London during World War II, RFK opens its nightly broadcasts of news, commentary, prayer, and music programs with the compelling drumming of a tabla (a small Indian drum) and the words in Farsi (Persian) and Pashto (the official national language of Afghanistan): "Here is Radio Free Kabul of the Afghan mujahideen."

Usually tagged at the end of each program is a 10-minute prerecorded tape in Russian by such leading dissidents as writers Vladimir Bukovsky or Vladimir Maximov aimed at provoking opposition among the 100,000 Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan.

This war of the airwaves has increasingly irked the Moscow-backed Kabul authorities. In particular, there is known to be growing concern among the Russians about the possibility of resistance broadcasts to the Soviet Muslim populations on the other side of the Oxus River, which delineates much of the Soviet-Afghan border.

"This is perhaps the most extraordinary form of opposition. It is fighting with words and not guns," noted Marek Halter, the Polish-born French writer who is a founding member of the RFK committee in Paris. "During World War II it was Radio London which gave the Europeans the true spirit of resistance. It is what effectively united the opposition movements."

For some European intellectuals who claim to be ill at ease with the moral quality of sending arms without themselves fighting was the case during the Spanish Civil War, the creation of RFK has enabled them to constructively aid the resistance. The radio network's continued support, they argue, could also provide a means for Americans not willing to involve themselves militarily in Afghanistan to provide direct aid.

Adding insult to injury, however, the Afghan mujahideen have now decided to establish a purely Russian-language station on Afghan soil manned in person by Soviet dissidents. According to Mr. Halter, the European RFK committees will send a team of Soviet exiles (who may not be identified) to an undisclosed location in Afghanistan where they will produce programs using prerecorded tapes and live broadcasts. In many respects, the new station will be like the *soldatensender* (soldiers' programs) operated by the Western Allies for German troops at the front during World War II.

Since its conception in 1981, RFK has had an enormous impact among the local Afghan population. According to diplomatic, resistance, and other sources, not only are the underground radio programs eagerly listened to in the guerrilla-held areas, but also in the Afghan capital, where the signal received is surprisingly loud and clear. As for

the shortwave broadcasts, a recently returned French observer reported picking it up along the Soviet frontier in the northern extremes of Afghanistan.

The network has presented the Afghan resistance with imaginative new possibilities in opposing the Soviet occupation of their country. "It is vital to have a means of combating the radio and television which is in the hands of the occupiers," said Marparwin Ali, an Afghan university lecturer in Paris when the radios were first launched.

One of the most popular parts of the program, which is transmitted in both Farsi and Pashto, is a 15-minute "letter box." Here queries from listeners in Kabul, the resistance-held areas, and the refugee camps in Pakistan are answered on the air. The letters are often brought in by friends and relatives visiting the areas where the hidden stations are located.

The communist press has consistently attacked the clandestine radio network as an affront to the Soviet Union and the government of Afghanistan. "The object of this subversive action, of these broadcasts, is to consolidate the counterrevolution, to try to disperse on the political help of the Soviet Union to the Afghan people," commented *Izvestia*.

Claiming that RFK was founded with the help of the CIA, the Russians were notably vexed last year by the reported broadcasts to the Soviet troops. When French TV dismissed the presence of clandestine radio stations in Afghanistan on a nationwide news show, the Soviet Embassy in Paris lodged a formal protest, warning that relations between France and the USSR could suffer.

Apart from trying to bombard the radio transmitters, the Russians have also banned the possession of FM receivers among both Afghan and Soviet soldiers. "It is something the Russians cannot really grasp," explained Halter. "It is not the BBC or the VOA which they're attacking, but the radio of the Afghan people themselves."

Although the European committees help provide funds, equipment, and technical assistance, the network is run by five of the six Peshawar-based political parties that have signed a basic RFK protocol. In addition to the 11 broadcasting units already in existence, they have established a modern and well-equipped studio in Peshawar. Prerecorded tapes are hand-carried to the stations across the border, where local producers transmit a mixture of live and prepared programs.

Overall, the Paris RFK committee maintains, the Afghans need an estimated \$250,000 to install and maintain the entire 36-station network. Each basic broadcasting unit costs roughly \$5,000 (France \$8,000) including transmitter and recording equipment.

"The problem right now is having enough funds to expand and ensuring that the network will develop professional standards," Halter said. Although quality varies from station to station, the broadcasts to Kabul heard by this reporter were unusually well-produced.

Receivers are another drawback. Most radio sets found in Afghanistan only have AM, long and short wave, but no FM. The RFK committees in Europe are launching a massive campaign to collect funds to purchase FM radio sets in Singapore and Hong Kong at \$15 to \$20 each. Using the slogan, "One Afghan, one radio," they hope to swamp Afghanistan with pocket-size receivers.

It is not just a matter of equipment. French volunteer technicians have already gone inside to help set up the transmitters and train local producers. But the war has taken its toll.

In the Panjshir Valley, for example, RFK lost three French-trained Afghan technicians when two were killed and one was captured during Soviet-Afghan attacks.

A new advisory team is expected to return to Pakistan and Afghanistan shortly not only to help set up the new Russian station but also to further develop the network.

Radio Free Kabul

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, November 29, 1982

CENTRAL ASIA BOOK SERIES

Edward Allworth will be the general editor of a new book series to be published by Duke University Press. The emphasis will be on contemporary developments in Central Asian society (including Afghanistan) using primarily indigenous sources. The series will offer a diversity of scholarship for publication: original research and analysis, reference books, memoirs, eye-witness accounts and other documents and translations. Scholars with manuscripts should write to Prof. Edward Allworth, 618 Kent Hall, Columbia Univ., New York, NY 10027

from William Safire
in the NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE 1/9.

Glacis

The award for the best new politico-diplomatic usage of 1982 goes to Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who used a word I never heard before to describe the country that lies between the Soviet Union and the gateway to the Persian Gulf: "Afghanistan might one day be intended by the Soviets to be a glacis."

"A what?" asked a press corps eager to advance its erudition. Mr. Yaqub-Khan, who converses easily in Romance languages as well as Russian and Urdu, was puzzled at the lack of understanding by the American press: *Glacis* is an old, established English word with a modern figurative meaning. From the sentence context, I offered *buffer* as a synonym, which the Foreign Minister accepted.

But *glacis*, pronounced GLAY-sis, is metaphorically much richer. Derived from the Old French *glacier*, "to slip, slide," a *glacis* began in English more than three centuries ago, meaning a fortification that sloped gradually to ground level, permitting an unrestricted field of fire. Later, *glacis plates* were sloping armor plates on ships. Finally, the figurative use took over: East Germany was seen by The Times of London in 1955 "as part of Russia's defensive glacis," and The Observer five years later agreed that the countries of Eastern Europe "form the glacis between the Soviet Union and the West."

A *glacis state*, then, is one that forms a defensive barrier between one power and its potential enemies. . .

How accurate a definition of Afghanistan, if the Soviets agree to withdraw and insist on leaving behind a Soviet-influenced Government.

This week Apple-wood Books will publish "The Brand-X Anthology of Fiction" (cloth, \$17.95; paper, \$11.95), a follow-up to Apple-wood's 1981 "Brand-X Anthology of Poetry" — both edited by William Zaranba. The new volume contains parodies of English and American fiction, starting with Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift and ending with Ian McEwan and Ann Beattie.

Kingsley Amls

Making his Sunday Times book reviewer's face (which tended to merge with his ape imitation) Dixon bent over the sheet of paper. Belching slightly, he wrote, "The influence of Somerset Maugham on the Modern Novel," and then used his ball-point pen to deal with an itch in his ear. For one frightful moment he found himself actually thinking of Somerset Maugham. His stomach turned over at the thought of that professional story-teller forcing near little stories to happen wherever he went. Was there anywhere he hadn't smoothly arrived — was there any place he hadn't milked for its ten-page "little masterpiece of narrative"?

Suddenly Dixon touched his toes three times with his forehead, howling like a hyena, and dashed to the telephone. "Is that Claridge's?" he piped a minute later in his Central Asian voice. "Maugham? Willie?" He scratched a buttock gleefully with the split toe of his left shoe. "You just listen this, Mr. Mum. Here come story you ain't never told. I tell you it." He broke off and clucked like a hen for thirty seconds, timing himself by his watch. "You sure miss plenty stories on account of you no come Afghanistan," he shrieked.

Edward Blishev

From the NYT BOOK REVIEW 2/20

William Safire again in
the NYT MAGAZINE 2/13:

The Awful Pravda

To people with a good ear for language, the almost-right word makes a clanking sound. Mark Twain once clobbered James Fenimore Cooper's prose by showing how the formerly revered author didn't quite get his clichés right. When Russian propagandists work in English, they attempt to assume a breezy journalese familiar to Americans, and do not always bring it off.

In a news release from the Soviet Embassy, translating an explanation in the Soviet daily Pravda of the true history of Afghanistan, four clichés go clank-clank-clank-clank. "The people strove to break away from the medieval dark," it begins, breaking the reader's stride immediately. You don't break away from the dark, you break out of the dark. It continues: "... and to doff the shackles of feudalism." You don't doff shackles, you doff a hat; you cast off shackles.

Soldiers Complain

Ten Soviet soldiers stationed in Afghanistan — nine of them officers — have complained to the armed forces newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* about a popular musical group sent to entertain them [Dec. 4]. The unusual letter criticizes the group, the Blue Guitars, for performing "pale copies of by no means the best Western songs" and "barbaric interpretations" of Russian songs. "Didn't the Moscow Concert Organization realize what kind of musical baggage the Blue Guitars were bringing us?" ask the writers.

The soldiers were also insulted by the group's behavior. "Even somebody who has not been here probably knows that we do not have many comforts," they write. "So what do you think it was like for us to hear rebukes that somebody did not have nice accommodations or that they were not regaled 'according to Russian custom'?" (See p. 44)

World Press Review/February 1983

A current Soviet joke...

Two planes were loaded in Moscow for Afghanistan. One carried ammunition and war supplies; the other canned goods and meat. The first arrived in Kabul; The second was shot down over the Urals.

A 'cast off' of another kind - Marilyn Berger in a review of MEMORIES OF AFGHANISTAN in the NEW WORLD REVIEW:

Nowhere is there direct reference to the October Revolution or the subsequent events in Afghanistan's neighbor to the north, but the fresh breeze they brought throughout Asia can be felt throughout the book. Nor does the author refer to the present situation in Afghanistan. One has the feeling, however, that he is undoubtedly watching with friendly interest as its people cast off their feudal fetters, one by one.

The following is from the Department of
State Report on Human Rights issued in
February, 1983:

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a remote, landlocked, and resource-poor country whose population primarily engages in subsistence agriculture. One of the world's least economically developed and socially integrated nations, Afghanistan contains a mosaic of ethnic and tribal groups whose kinship ties cross national borders. While sharing a fundamental belief in Islam, Afghanistan's population is divided by ethnic, regional, tribal, and sectarian cleavages. Independent, xenophobic, and fanatical in their fractiousness, Afghans traditionally unite only in the face of foreign invasion or a perceived threat to their conservative Islamic beliefs.

The last Afghan king, Zahir Shah, was deposed in 1973 by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, who established a republican-style Government. In 1978 this Government was overthrown by a Marxist coup staged by the Khalq faction of the small People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The Khalqist Marxist president, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was subsequently deposed in September 1979 by his Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin. In December 1979 Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, killed President Amin and his family, and installed a puppet regime led by Babrak Karmal of the minority Parcham faction of the ruling Party.

Strong resistance to the regime and the Soviet invasion developed quickly and has spread and grown. Armed opposition by the mujahidin (freedom fighters) is now countrywide, although the various resistance groups are not united.

Soviet advisors have moved into controlling positions in the Afghan government ministries, in the army, and in the organs of the security apparatus and are involved in all significant decisions. The Sovietization of important institutions such as industries, the media, and the educational system, is now complete. The Soviets control the central Government of Afghanistan. They appear to have no intention of withdrawing their soldiers nor their influence.

The most pervasive and systematic violator of Afghan human rights is the Kabul regime's 20,000-strong secret police organization, known officially as the State Information Services and unofficially by its Persian acronym, KHAD. KHAD's chief, Dr. Najibullah, is a Party politburo member and a Parcham faction leader. Najibullah presides over a multi-faceted organization which is modeled upon the Soviet KGB and is responsible for foreign and domestic intelligence collection and clandestine operations; for maintaining public order through surveillance, arrest, imprisonment, interrogation, torture, trial, and sentencing; and even, via its military wing, for the conduct of the Soviet-sponsored war. In a closed society, and with no rival institution capable of checking its influence, KHAD is the law in Kabul and other cities and towns controlled by the regime. KGB officers are assigned to every major department of KHAD, from the director's office down, and all major KHAD operations require Soviet approval before implementation. In effect, KHAD has become an increasingly efficient agent of terror and repression and a prime tool for Soviet control of the Afghan population. Violations of human rights in Afghanistan take place in the context of a bitter war between a martial and highly independent people and a powerful and determined invader. The Soviet Union seeks not only to dominate Afghanistan militarily, but to convert that traditional and highly decentralized Muslim society into a modern communist state. To achieve this, the Soviets are using not only military force, Soviet decision-makers in all major Afghan government offices, and an all-pervasive secret police apparatus, but also a large-scale, long-term program of training and indoctrinating Afghan young people and children in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. This multi-faceted effort is supported by the small corps of communists who make up the party. Party leaders claim approximately 60,000 members, which would constitute only 1 percent of the Afghan population, estimated to have been 15 million before the Soviet invasion. The overwhelming majority of Afghans has chosen to resist the Soviets and their puppet regime. The result of this conflict is the tearing apart of Afghanistan and above all, the inflicting of great hardship on the general population.

The scope and efficiency of the secret police are increasing in areas of the country under regime control. The result is the creation of a pervasive atmosphere of mutual suspicion and fear in the cities and towns controlled by the regime. Tensions in urban areas are heightened by the systematic violation of the sanctity of the home by military and secret police forces searching for arms, new recruits, loot, and political

RUSSIA IN AFGHANISTAN - excerpts
from an article in The Economist
January 8.

The Russians have reason to be upset by one turn the war in Afghanistan took last year: the fighting has been carried by the guerrillas into Soviet territory. A senior defector from the Afghan secret police has confirmed that the guerrillas have operated inside Soviet Tadzhikistan. Professor Rabbani of the guerrilla organisation, Jamiat Islami, claims that the Mujaheddin have staged attacks in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The Mujaheddin have improved their training and tactics. The guerrillas no longer operate in large, disorganised and vulnerable bands but in small groups, each under a single commander. Several of the most effective commanders are former Afghan army officers who have defected; others have been trained in Pakistan or Iran.

Soviet claims that there are some 80 guerrilla training camps in Pakistan are exaggerated; yet there are a few such camps in the tribal area. They are usually run by former Afghan army officers who have received training in Russia or at other foreign military colleges, such as Dehra Dun in India. In one camp visited by our correspondent, the "cadets" wore uniforms, the instructors stressed the need for discipline, organisation and command structures, and there was said to be instruction on mortar firing, sabotage and explosives....

One of the most effective guerrilla commanders to emerge from the Afghan war is Mr Ahmad Shah Massoud, who has been leading the resistance forces in the Panjshir valley. Mr Massoud originally ran a guerrilla training school in the valley which attracted resistance commanders from elsewhere in Afghanistan. He has long stressed the need for guerrilla tactics to be subordinated to an overall strategy. Many guerrilla forces still merely descend from the mountains, carry out as many attacks as they can, and then withdraw.

Squabblers-in-exile

Some co-ordination, money and arms are provided by the exile groups from their headquarters in Peshawar. But their distance from the fighting puts them at a disadvantage. Mr Massoud and other commanders are their own bosses on the fighting fronts.

The Peshawar exiles are also split between two broad alliances: the moderate resistance groups, led by Mr Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, Mr Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and Sheikh Syed Gailani; and an alliance of Islamic fundamentalists led by Professor Rabbani, Mr Maulvi Yunus Khalis, Professor Sayyaf and the uncompromising Mr Gulbuddin Heckmatyar.

The moderate alliance argues that it is

Vladimir Solovyov on AFGHANISTAN AND THE EVIL OF OPTIMISM

Unlike the recent war in Lebanon, which was televised (albeit somewhat censored), the war in Afghanistan is reported solely by rumor. Even the Western journalists disguised as Afghans in turbans and baggy pantaloons are evoked to supply, by dint of that operatic masquerade, what is lacking in their own reportage: facts and plausibility.

Sometimes these accounts seem entirely fantastic, though editors insist that their reporters have traveled with the partisan caravans along the mountain paths of Afghanistan—trips that last many days, cover many miles, and involve great hardships. If one were to add up the figures reported by various correspondents during the past two years regarding the number of Soviet soldiers killed, wounded, and taken prisoner, as well as the aircraft, tanks, and armored cars destroyed by the Afghan rebels, one would have to conclude that the Red Army no longer possesses either personnel or functioning equipment and that the rebel victory will take place, if not today, then tomorrow at the very latest.

In their reporting on last fall's offensive by Soviet and loyalist Afghan troops in the Panjshir Valley—the biggest military operation since the Soviet invasion in December, 1979—American journalists appeared to be in competition as to who could be most optimistic. One of them, writing in the *Christian Science Monitor*, compared the heavy losses of the Soviet and government forces (three thousand killed and wounded, hundreds of defectors, dozens of tanks and aircraft destroyed, etc.) to the almost total absence of rebel losses. Another, appearing in *Time* magazine, told of Soviet bombs that do not explode and of how the rebels use the detonators as mines. Even when Soviet bombs do explode, no great harm is done. For example, this same *Time* reporter noted that Soviet planes dropped 223 bombs on the village of Parandeh (one stands in awe of such skill at counting), killing only one peasant and a cow.

As a natural consequence of this wave of optimism, various suggestions have been made as to how the Soviet Union can find a face-saving way out of Afghanistan—the unconditional or stage-by-stage withdrawal of its troops, the Finlandization of Afghanistan, and so forth. Meanwhile the Soviet Union, having driven the local population out of seized territory, is rapidly building large military air bases—one at Shindand in the western part of the country and another in the narrow corridor leading to China. It is also constructing a strategically important railroad from its border to Kabul and a bridge across the Amur-Darya. Judging from appearances, it has no intention of leaving the country it conquered with relative ease.

The implausibility of the reportage from Afghanistan is especially astounding against the background of Israel's defeat of the Palestinian guerrillas, who—unlike the Afghans—enjoyed the active financial and military support of the Arab world and the Soviet Union. If Israel, a nation of three million, could deal successfully with the Palestinians in Lebanon, can we imagine that a superpower like the Soviet Union quails in front of the Afghans? Is this not an aberration of vision, such that people are seeing not what is in front of their eyes but what they want to see?

This aberration leads in turn to the hyperbolic notion that Afghanistan is Russia's Vietnam—this despite the fact that there is little basis for comparison. The war in South Vietnam was carried on by North Vietnam with the aid of two superpowers, China and the USSR, thus assuring a constant supply of weapons. Afghanistan is a single nation occupied by the USSR. Within this nation are ten or a dozen groups of *mujahedin* to whom the West gives enormous moral support—and little else.

Even more important, however, is the difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the former there is no public opinion, no free press, no opposition, no pacifists, no draft-dodgers, no liberals—not even a Daniel Ellsberg. It is fear alone that welds together the last empire on earth. Even if, over a ten-year occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union were to lose 55,000 soldiers, as America did in Vietnam, that fact (1) would not become known to the Soviet people, (2) would not provoke mass protests, and (3) would not compel the Soviets to leave Afghanistan

or even to agree to concessions. Totalitarian countries are much less sensitive than are democracies to public opinion, and to losses of human life as well. What are the losses in Afghanistan compared to 20 million Soviet citizens killed in World War II and at least as many under Stalin's terror?

The price in men and matériel for the acquisition of Afghanistan is one the USSR can afford. This is the cost of a network of bases that could be used against China. Afghanistan has no strategic value other than its proximity to China; and the 100,000 Soviet troops stationed there are no other than reinforcements of the million troops on the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet Union has conceived a need for the territory of Afghanistan, though not for its population. It is a matter not of occupation but of annexation. In addition to those killed, there are three million Afghan refugees—a fifth of the population of Afghanistan. And this latter process is continuing.

As for the optimism in the American press, it benefits no one quite so much as the Soviet Union. Sympathy for Afghan refugees and indignation at Soviet actions now have been completely supplanted by admiration for the fantastic feats of the rebels. Under cover of romanticism and heroics, the leveling of Afghanistan and its people continues unabated.

Vladimir Solovyov, a Russian-born historian and journalist, regularly covers foreign affairs for Worldview and other American publications.

PCV NOTE

In January of 1964 the 3rd group of PCVs/Afghanistan flew to Kabul. If you were in that group or know people who were, we'd be interested in your observations of the experience then and the situation now. If you would like to help with a 20-year PCV/Afghanistan newsletter, please contact Susan and Denis Aronson
35 Grandview Drive
St. Albans, West Virginia 25177
by 1 July, 1983.

fighting a war of national liberation, the aim being simply to get the Russians out; after that the Afghan people should be allowed to choose their own form of government. The fundamentalists' aim is to install in Kabul a pure Islamic government adhering strictly to the Koran. The Hezb-I-Islami group led by Mr Gulbuddin has links with the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt. He told your correspondent that he is as much against "western imperialism" as he is against the communism that Russia is imposing on his country.

Mr Gulbuddin is heartily disliked by most of the Afghans in Peshawar who are not members of his organisation; your correspondent heard repeated allegations that he was working for the Russians, that his men were engaged in fighting against other guerrilla groups more than against the Soviet army and that he was more eager to become the most powerful resistance commander than to pursue the war. A letter purporting to come from Mr Gulbuddin was recently circulated in Peshawar; it told his men to let other resistance groups bear the brunt of the fighting to seize control of liberated areas and not to share arms or ammunition with other groups. Mr Gulbuddin said it was a fake and just part of the propaganda war that "western imperialism" had been waging against him because of his Islamic zeal.

Mr Gulbuddin was scathing about the emergence of various "heroes" on the fighting fronts of Afghanistan. He argued that victory required the forming of a national movement with clear principles, such as Hezb-I-Islami. There was little doubt that one "hero" he had in mind was Commander Massood, whom westerners have compared with Tito. Mr Gulbuddin believes such men have been deliberately built up by the west. . .

Raid on Soviet convoys have been answered by immediate air attacks on undefended villages. Areas in which guerrilla columns are thought to be operating are devastated. The forces of Commander Massood could not be dislodged from the Panjshir valley, so the entire valley was treated as a target. There also appears to be a deliberate Soviet policy of destroying food stocks, wheatfields, livestock and water wells to deprive the Mujaheddin of the means of survival and to force the local population to look to the government in Kabul for food and relief supplies. . .

Other recent arrivals in Peshawar from Kabul paint a grim picture of everyday life in the city. Social life has almost ground to a halt. Fear of the pressgangs has driven most men off the streets; only the old, the very young and women remain. Many shops have closed (although those selling consumer goods from the west and Japan do brisk busi-

ness). In the countryside, where the regime's control is generally minimal or non-existent, a different order of human rights is being violated. The population in war zones suffers loss of property and life from increasingly frequent bombardments by regime and Soviet forces, from being caught in crossfires, and from exactions by regime and Soviet forces as well as by elements of the resistance.

While the beginning of the Babrak Karmal regime was less repressive and brutal than the Taraki/Amal period, with many political prisoners being released from prisons, the Karmal regime has grown more repressive with time and this trend appears to be accelerating. With the Soviet military offensives of 1982 the civilian population throughout Afghanistan suffered greater devastation than ever before. As KHA's power and efficiency increase, so does its control over the population; as the Afghan army's need for recruits continues to be a major problem, so sweeps for draft-age men will continue. Thus the situation for human rights in Afghanistan is likely to deteriorate still further as the struggle continues between the Soviet and Babrak regime forces on one hand and the mujahidin on the other.

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Killing

Continuing inability to crush the Afghan resistance in 1982 has led Soviet forces and the puppet Babrak Karmal regime increasingly to target and kill the civilian populace in areas of high mujahidin activity. The residential neighborhoods of Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, were heavily bombed in early 1982 with high civilian casualties. Later in the year the towns and villages of the strategic Panjshir Valley were bombed and rocketed until some villages and many dwellings were destroyed. Not far from Kabul, the villages of the Lowgar Valley to the south, the resort town of Paghman to the northeast, and the villages of the Shomali region to the north have suffered months of bombing, rocketing, and shelling in 1982. While no sure estimate of casualties is possible, survivors speak of thousands killed or wounded, primarily women and children.

Survivors also relate the savagery and lack of regard for life shown by Soviet troops searching for resistance fighters, weapons, and loot. There are numerous accounts which are given wide credence of rape, butchery, and looting by Soviet troops sent into Kandahar following the bombing last January. There are also eyewitness reports of unprovoked murders in the Shomali region. In one Shomali village, according to reliable sources, all males over the age of ten were shot in the presence of their female relatives. On another occasion, Soviet soldiers blew the front door off a house with a tank round and machine-gunned an elderly man for his money. In another incident an 18 year-old boy was shot dead by Soviets in front of his mother and the equivalent of \$70 taken from his body.

Summary execution is not uncommon on the battlefield and in Afghan prisons. After interrogation, captured mujahidin are often killed on the spot, as are Afghan soldiers attempting to defect to the resistance. In mid-1982, captured and imprisoned members of an extreme leftist group opposed to the regime were taken from their cells and machine-gunned by prison officials in retaliation for a series of assassinations reportedly carried out by other members of the organization.

The mujahidin have responded in kind. At the beginning of the conflict resistance fighters usually killed captured Soviet prisoners. More recently, however, some resistance leaders have kept Soviet prisoners in their custody. Beginning in 1982, some captured Soviet soldiers have been transferred to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for internment in Switzerland. Afghan soldiers who are taken prisoner are usually given the option of changing sides. In urban areas, including the capital, resistance against the Soviets, Afghan communists, and other figures sympathetic to the regime are daily occurrences. There are also credible reports of occasional fights and assassinations between rival resistance groups.

b. Disappearance

Though not as frequent as during predecessor communist governments, disappearance of citizens under the current regime remains commonplace. Many who disappear are picked up by KHA but many others are caught in frequent sweeps to round up men for military service. In efforts to increase the size of the army in 1982 there was a series of revisions to the draft laws which extended the tour of duty for regular recruits by six months to three years. Other reservists had their present

hours extended, and another class of reservists became eligible for duty when the age ceiling was raised from 35 to 39. The net effect was a sizable increase in desertions, forcing the army to use even more sweep operations to find recruits. Even though the legal draft age is 19, many younger boys along with older men are seized on the street and dragged into military service. Relatives often do not know whether a person has been forcibly conscripted or taken by the KHAD and imprisoned for real or imagined crimes against the regime. Families sometimes learn that relatives have been imprisoned through requests for money, food, or clothes passed along by prison guards or released prisoners. In some cases, relatives and friends of the detainee are allowed short and regular visits.

c. Torture

Afghan security services clearly resort to torture as a means of interrogation and punishment, often in the presence of Soviet advisers. Refugees frequently refer to torture in recounting their experiences, and foreign prisoners have observed the frequent presence in interrogation rooms of the torturer's paraphernalia such as electrodes for administering electric shocks. In addition to electric shock, often applied to the genitals, beatings, and sexual violation, one eyewitness reported seeing prisoners kept in neck-deep water for ten hours at a time in early 1982.

One Afghan who was held for eight days in April 1982 in the KHAD detention center in the Prime Ministry told of the torture that was inflicted on his cellmates. One young man had his head beaten against a wall, had had electric shock, his nails broken and pulled out, and had not been allowed to sleep for four days. A hunchback had been repeatedly picked up and thrown against a wall. Another inmate's face was grossly swollen from belt beatings, and his hands were swollen and broken from continuous blows from rifle butts.

To what extent torture is being used by both sides on Afghanistan's battlefields cannot be estimated. While resistance groups occasionally allow the transfer of Soviet prisoners to Pakistan, a more common fate is summary execution, sometimes preceded by mutilation such as blinding, docking of ears, amputation of noses, castration, and flogging. There are reports of similar treatment meted out to officers of the ruling party captured in the Panjsher Valley during the Soviet/ regime offensive to crush the resistance in that area in May and June 1982.

d. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Conditions at the Pol-e-Charkhi prison near Kabul, the largest in the country, vary from acceptable, by traditional Afghan norms, to conditions constituting extreme violations of human rights. The food is inadequate, cells overcrowded, and prisoners are virtually non-existent, but the majority of sanitary facilities are allowed the freedom of the central courtyard during the day and may receive food, laundry, and money sent by relatives. A smaller number of prisoners, primarily foreigners or relatives of officials from the previous two communist governments, are accorded better quarters, food, and other privileges. Other prisoners, however, according to reliable reports, are kept in darkness and solitary confinement. According to an eyewitness account, prisoners are sometimes bound so tightly and for so long that they are unable to feed themselves when freed from their bonds. Bad as they are at the Pol-e-Charkhi prison, conditions at the Kabul city jail, the detention cells at the Prime Ministry, and various KHAD installations in Kabul appear to be considerably worse, leading some prisoners to bribe officials in order to be transferred to Pol-e-Charkhi prison. One man who was held and then released from the Prime Ministry detention center spoke of huge cells, holding three to four hundred prisoners, with no room for the inmates to sit or lie down. Similar cells held equal numbers of women. Information about conditions inside provincial prisons, which are often the targets of resistance attacks, is limited, but they appear to be very grim.

Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of the civilian population is commonplace in areas of active fighting between mujahidin and Soviet/ regime forces. For example, from May through September, villages in the Panjsher Valley were reduced to rubble by constant bombings, the burning of grain and other foodstuffs, and the occasional killing of livestock. Both in the Panjman and Shomali regions in summer 1982 Soviet soldiers burned stocks of grain, slaughtered livestock, looted valuables, and despoiled what food they did not steal from houses. In violation of Afghan and Islamic norms, Soviet patrols also searched and occasionally abducted women from villages in the Shomali.

ness with off-duty Soviet soldiers, who are especially interested in jeans). There are long queues outside shops selling essential goods. Prices are said to have soared.

One recent defector claimed that the city faced an acute food shortage. Mr Karmal himself has spoken of difficulties with supplies. At a convention of traders in the city in October, he said Afghanistan had been forced to import more than 100,000 tons of wheat, 30,000 tons of rice, 17,000 tons of cooking oil, 70,000 tons of sugar and 1,000 tons of dairy products. One reason he gave for the shortages was Afghanistan's lack of hard currency. Another reason left unstated by Mr Karmal was that his allies in the Soviet army have been devastating large areas of the countryside.

The food shortage in Kabul has been exacerbated by an influx of "internal refugees" who have been driven out of their homes and off their farms. These people are kept by the government at subsistence level. Many of those who remain in the countryside are said to face the prospect of famine this winter. Resistance groups in Peshawar are trying to persuade western agencies to send food supplies into the "liberated" areas. French and Swedish voluntary agencies are responding; British voluntary groups have been slower off the mark. . .

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 8, 1983

HARRISON RESPONDS TO KHALILZAD (see Vol. XI, No. 1 p. 15) in a letter to the NYT in December.

In his Dec. 16 letter, Zalmay Khalilzad seriously misrepresents the character of the current United Nations effort to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, discussed in my Dec. 6 Op-Ed article.

The projected U.N. settlement process would not permit the "forceful" repatriation of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan anticipated by Mr. Khalilzad. On the contrary, it would require an indirect dialogue under U.N. auspices between the Kabul regime and representatives of the refugees concerning a variety of issues governing their repatriation.

In particular, refugee spokesmen could use this dialogue to press for the transformation of the present Communist regime into a more broad-based government and for the establishment of workable safeguards, subject to U.N. monitoring, that would protect the security and property rights of those refugees desiring to return. Should this dialogue fail to produce a compromise acceptable to the refugees, the settlement process could not be consummated.

SELIG S. HARRISON
Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
New York, Dec. 21, 1982

By DREW MIDDLETON

Special to The New York Times

Western intelligence analysts say that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, now in their fourth winter there, appear to be absorbing the basic lessons of guerrilla warfare.

Although complete control of the country continues to elude them, the Soviet troops

Military have reportedly made Analysis tactical and organizational

changes that, according to the analysts, should improve security and reduce casualties.

No Soviet figures on casualties have been made public, but European and American estimates range from 12,000 to 15,000 Soviet troops killed and wounded since their intervention in Afghanistan began in December 1979.

At the start of the Soviet campaign against guerrillas in Afghanistan in early 1980, their convoys were lightly guarded and the infantry operated without sufficient air support. Convoy losses were high for nearly two years, according to the analysts.

An Increased Use of Copters

Improvement, Western intelligence analysts say, has come largely as a result of the increased use of helicopters. British sources estimate that there are 500 to 600 helicopters deployed in Afghanistan and that, of these, nearly 200 are Mi-24 attack aircraft, which are code-named Hind by NATO.

When the Soviet command selects an area of guerrilla activity, the attack is made by troops carried by helicopter and supported, once on the ground, by Mi-24's.

Western intelligence sources say the Soviet troops have also been able to adjust weaponry to suit the peculiarities of fighting in Afghanistan. They found, the informants said, that tank guns could not be elevated high enough to be effective against Afghans on the crests of hills or mountains. The solution was said to be to mount twin 23-millimeter anti-aircraft guns on trucks and include these in the escort of convoys.

The improvement in Soviet tactics and organization has been accompanied, however, by a similar but slower improvement in the guerrillas' tactics. Smaller, more effective units under a single command have taken over most of the fighting from the large, unorganized bands that made the first attacks and suffered heavy losses.

Improvement in Rebels' Arms

There has also been an appreciable improvement in the Afghans' arms, although the guerrilla forces are generally outgunned by the Soviet forces. Heavy machine guns, mortars and recoilless rifles are said to be entering Afghanistan in increasing numbers.

The Western informants point out that the Soviet units that first entered Afghanistan, like all Soviet units, had been trained for operations involving a road network, secure communications and well-defined targets.

cont. on next page.

Afghan War: Soviet Learns From Rebels

Security forces continue to use air-dropped anti-personnel mines in areas of suspected resistance activity. During a mid-1982 withdrawal from the upper Panjshir Valley, Soviet and Afghan forces left behind booby-trapped houses, weapons, and household items. Non-lethal chemicals such as riot-control agents, irritants, and incapacitants have been used regularly by the Soviets in Afghanistan. In November 1982, the Department of State issued an updated report on the Soviet use of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, which gives convincing evidence on the continued selective Soviet employment of lethal chemical weapons against the mujahidin in 1982. Analysis of two contaminated Soviet gas masks acquired in Afghanistan shows the use of the deadly trichothecene mycotoxins ("yellow rain"). There are reports that Soviet soldiers poisoned underground waterways in Lowgar Province where the mujahidin were hiding. Other reports note nerve gases and crystals, often dropped from airplanes or helicopters.

e. Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment

Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment continue to be a pervasive fact of day-to-day life in Afghanistan. The number of political detainees is difficult to estimate since the Babrak regime seldom distinguishes political from other criminals. In Kabul there are probably between 10,000 and 25,000 inmates in the Pol-e-Charkhi prison, a further 400 at the KHAD detention center in the Prime Ministry, and an undetermined number in the dozen or so houses and offices which the KHAD has converted into jails. A substantial portion of those held at Pol-e-Charkhi are believed to be political prisoners, and the vast majority in the KHAD's detention centers are there for alleged political offenses.

Afghans in regime-controlled areas live in constant fear of arbitrary and often inexplicable arrest. In one case, an Afghan white-collar worker was held without charge for three months in mid-1982, after having been picked up in a neighborhood search. During his confinement, in several KHAD detention centers, he was questioned only occasionally, and always on subjects other than his presence in the suspect neighborhood, without any explanation whatever. Afghans with less education have commented in bewilderment to fellow prisoners that they have no idea why they are in jail.

The corruption which permeates KHAD sometimes alleviates some of the system's cruelty, at least for those with money and a measure of influence. Middle class Afghans often pay large bribes to KHAD officers and "judges" in the hope of obtaining the release of a relative or friend on one of the national holidays when acts of clemency are traditional. Prominent Afghans who are not co-opted into the system are sometimes able to intervene successfully with friends and relations in high regime places to secure the release of political detainees or to avoid being arrested themselves. As often as not, however, KHAD officers take their bribes and then fail to do what they promised.

f. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Most of those accused of non-political offenses are apparently tried in the civil court system under the norms of pre-communist judicious codes. All courts, whether civil, military, or secret police, are controlled by the regime. The law of the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, issued in 1981, sets out as the first priority of the system "the safeguarding and protection of the gains of the Saur Revolution." One consequence is that plaintiffs may be denied due judicial process because of their political beliefs or social position. Often imprisoned for months without trial, Afghan political prisoners are tried and sentenced, in secret with KHAD playing a major role. On the rare occasions when foreigners are accused of political crimes, they are given a "defense lawyer," but are not allowed to question regime witnesses, whose testimony is invariably accepted as fact by the court.

The Afghan regime occasionally uses its judicial process as part of its unrelenting propaganda effort. In the summer of 1981, Kabul TV viewers were shown a previously filmed "trial" of the British archeologist, Pinder-Wilson, who, after being picked up and held incommunicado for several months, was tried on the charges of having smuggled artifacts out of Afghanistan, of giving false information to the Western news media, and of aiding Afghans to flee the country. The judicial process was a sham; in the end he was expelled on Babrak karmal's personal order. All this had been worked out before, not according to law, but at the whim of the omnipresent secret police.

Journalists' accounts from the Panjshir Valley confirm that at least some resistance groups have established prisons for

captured Soviet and Afghan military detainees, and that there are now resistance "courts" for judging officers. Little is known of the working of these bodies, although they are believed to be based on Islamic jurisprudence.

g. Invasion of the Home

Forced entry into private homes, both by day and by night, is a regular occurrence in Afghan cities and towns, and in rural villages suspected of harboring mujahidin. Official intruders include military press gangs looking for new recruits or draft evaders; army, police, or party cadres searching for hidden weapons; secret police or party functionaries pursuing leads on regime opponents; and Soviet and Babrak Karmal soldiers seeking loot. The Afghan populace universally assumes that the secret police monitor phone calls, and there is no question that incoming and outgoing international mail is opened by the regime.

2. Respect for Civil and Political Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

All the information media are controlled by the regime and its Soviet decision-makers, who assert tight control over content. The press, radio, and television are used solely to convey and reflect regime policy and Soviet views of world events. Criticism of the regime or the USSR is not permitted. In mid-1982, the regime forbade the unlicensed importation and sale of all foreign video and music tapes, magazines, books, posters, and other publications on the grounds that they might contain material contrary to "religion and traditional Afghan values."

In Kabul and other cities, "shabnamas" or "night letters," which are a traditional Afghan means of expressing political dissent, circulate surreptitiously. The regime considers the printing and circulation of such handbills to be criminal. In mid-1982 a student suspected of circulating night letters was sentenced to five years imprisonment. There are also several small, clandestine radio transmitters operated by the resistance which broadcast short programs attacking the regime and its Soviet backers and reporting mujahidin activity around the country.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The regime only permits assemblies which serve its purposes, and all such meetings are carefully orchestrated. In order to create the impression of popular support for various policies, the regime frequently stages meetings and demonstrations both in Kabul and other towns. Although Afghanistan has a minuscule industrialized sector, the regime continues to develop official labor organizations controlled by the Government. These have no right to negotiate or strike. Afghanistan's few professional bodies, such as the Academy of Sciences, are totally controlled by the regime.

c. Freedom of Religion

Afghanistan has for centuries been an overwhelmingly Islamic nation, though small Hindu, Sikh, and Jewish enclaves of foreign origin have traditionally been tolerated. The present regime is based on parties that were militantly secularist in orientation. The Babrak Karmal regime now goes to great lengths to associate itself with Islam: major policy initiatives are immediately sanctioned by a regime-controlled council of religious figures, and the media constantly portray the regime as the defender of the faith. Despite these efforts, the vast majority of the religious leadership and the populace of Afghanistan consider the regime and its Soviet sponsors anathema to the tenets of Islam.

d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Travel within Afghanistan has been severely disrupted by the war. Resistance attacks on military convoys, destruction of bridges, and mining of some secondary roads have rendered overland travel difficult and dangerous. Surface travelers also run the risk of becoming involved in the frequent clashes between resistance fighters and Soviet/regime troops. They face "tolls" exacted by Soviet soldiers and mujahidin alike, as well as possibly becoming victims of outright banditry in remote areas. The regime attempts to control foreign travel. Permission for professionals, such as doctors, engineers and academics, to travel outside the communist world is routinely denied for fear they will not return. Businessmen can still obtain passports, but many Afghans are forced to pay bribes of over \$1,000 to have a passport issued. Bank or property

Now, however, Soviet military publications print reports on what are called "training exercises" bearing a close resemblance to operations in Afghanistan. They feature instructions in mountain fighting, convoy security, night operations and antispero tactics.

Some Soviet writers complain about the poor standard of marksmanship of Soviet infantrymen. Others recommend the formation of special antispero squads and strict attention to covering fire when one section of a unit moves into the attack.

Some analysts report that the Russians have introduced what are called air assault brigades to take advantage of their superior mobility. One article in *International Defense Review* put the number of such brigades at five.

Some European experts on the war say they believe that the overall strength of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan has now gone well over the total of 105,000 soldiers and airmen that has been generally accepted. But American intelligence officers monitoring Soviet operations view some of their estimates with skepticism.

One such European estimate put Soviet military strength in Afghanistan at 152,000. This figure was said to include 90,000 infantrymen in divisions and independent brigades, 50,000 other troops in support and combat forces, 10,000 air force men and 2,000 advisers in the Afghan Army.

American intelligence sources say they spotted early in 1980 what has apparently proved to be the weakest point in the Soviet command system: in operations against guerrillas, junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers are required to make instant decisions without reference to higher command.

Armament Considered Uneven

Most of these small-unit commanders, the informants point out, have almost no experience in this sort of decision-making and no training for it because of the Soviet Union's emphasis on centralized command. The result is said to be an operational inflexibility that increases the number of failures in small-unit operations.

Because most of the divisions sent to Afghanistan were at the second or third categories of readiness, the informants said, the Soviet troops went into battle with old equipment, especially field guns and tanks. The situation has reportedly been altered by the slow introduction of newer weaponry. But overall the armament is considered uneven.

One problem that the Russians apparently are now confronting results from guerrilla activity near the Soviet frontier. Officials of a guerrilla group known as Jamiat Islami assert that their forces have attacked targets in the Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The Russians also appear worried by what they assert are military training camps in Pakistan where guerrillas are taught tactics and command structure and the need for discipline is stressed by instructors, many of whom are deserters from the Afghan Army.

NYT

1/23

Top Dog



The New York Times/Jan Wilson

Ch. Kabik's The Challenger after winning best-in-show prize. Handler and owner is Chris Terrell.

Derek Rayne, from Carmel, Calif., would be responsible for selecting America's dog of the year.

First in line was a striking black and tan Afghan, a breed whose history has been traced to 4,000 B.C.

"This is a dog with the look of an eagle, and judging from the way he flew around the floor, I think he could outrun the desert wind. He's the best Afghan I've ever seen."

The dog, known as Pepel, is owned by Marguerite and Chris Terrell, who have a boarding kennel and breed Afghans in Anacortes, Wash. Pepel is a homebred, and Terrell does the showing.

Pepel has a most impressive record. The Westminster best was his 44th, and he has been best hound 91 times. Last year he was the top group-winning hound in the country, and with 88 blue rosettes captured the Ken-L. Nation award.

NYT 2/17 (from an article by W.R. Fletcher)

deposits are often asked of Afghans applying to leave the country for short periods and passports are commonly confiscated by airport authorities on their return. Afghan pilgrims to Mecca are issued documents valid only for the pilgrimage in an effort to keep them from leaving the country permanently.

While legal emigration is thus virtually impossible, large numbers of Afghans continue to depart the country clandestinely to seek refuge abroad. Most estimates place the number of Afghan refugees at over three million--over 20 percent of Afghanistan's former population.

e. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, a totalitarian one-party state ruled by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has given way to a totalitarian apparatus controlled totally by the Soviet Union. Soviet military and civilian advisors sit in almost all ministries and make or approve every significant decision done in the name of the regime. The Party itself is ruled by a small group who form the Party's politburo. The Party is torn in feuding between its Khalqi and Parcham factions. The less numerous Parchamis (including Babrak) retain control of the Party apparatus. Regime figures put party membership at 60,000 (out of pre-1978 population of close to 15 million), though actual membership is probably much lower. Membership in the Party (the only legal one)--and effectively membership in the Parcham faction--is a prerequisite for political participation and professional advancement. There has been no constitution since the first Marxist coup in 1978. The Babrak Karmal regime has stated that the 64 principles enumerated in early 1980 will serve as an interim constitution.

In the roughly 75 to 80 percent of the countryside of Afghanistan controlled by the mujahidin, the political process is controlled by resistance groups. These groups usually have some ties to the various resistance offices located in Peshawar, Pakistan, but communication and coordination between the various groups and these offices, and between the resistance groups themselves, is naturally uneven, uncoordinated, and difficult. Local mujahidin groups control political and judicial activities that take place in their areas, and also often levy taxes. In some areas the mujahidin authorities are traditional tribal figures, in others young military organizers. Under the conditions existing, the authority of leaders necessarily depends on some form of popular consent.

3. Government Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal regime has been censured for its human rights record by many international bodies, including the UN Human Rights Commission. The regime rejects such resolutions and portrays them as interference in its internal affairs. In mid-August 1982 a four-man International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) team was allowed to come to Kabul to discuss the possibility of a program within Afghanistan, the first such visit since the ICRC was expelled in 1980. Although the ICRC representatives were allowed to visit some hospitals in Kabul and parts of the Pol-e-Charkhi prison, the delegation was asked to leave in early October. Major human rights international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have expressed concern about the Afghan situation. Freedom House gives Afghanistan its lowest ranking for political rights and civil liberties. The Peoples' Permanent Tribunal, the successor to the Russell Tribunal, at its second session on Afghanistan in Paris in December 1982, condemned the Soviet Union for violations of the rules of war "which are closely linked to the inalienable rights of the Afghan people."

4. Economic, Social, and Cultural Situation

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an estimated per-capita income of \$150 in 1982. Since the coup and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, economic conditions have deteriorated. The difficulty of internal travel has disrupted the internal marketing system, and interrupted the movement of surplus regional agricultural products to areas of scarcity. In most of the countryside, there is no significant regime administrative, financial, and educational and medical facilities are at a minimum. In some areas, the populace relies on local resistance organizations for basic commodities

and medicines. In areas under regime control, some social services exist but are frequently disrupted by fighting between Soviet/regime forces and mujahidin. Large numbers of internal refugees, who have been driven from their villages by Soviet bombardments to Kabul and provincial capitals in 1982, have severely strained already inadequate services.

The participation of Afghan women in activities beyond the home has always been severely limited by the traditional beliefs and religious practices of Afghanistan. Before the 1978 coup d'état the literacy rate for women was only 2 percent. Since the installation of the Babrak regime, socially the position of women has improved in Kabul, and other large cities under the control of the Soviets and regime forces, and women in these localities have better access to education. In areas of intense fighting and in areas of mujahidin control the role of women remains as it traditionally has been.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan has also changed the demographic profile of the country. The literacy rate before the forced closing and destruction of over 2,000 government schools and the flight of many draft age students was under 10 percent. The school enrollment rate in Afghanistan has necessarily declined below what it was in 1978. Civilian and military casualties and the massive continuing exodus of Afghan refugees have certainly lowered the average life expectancy, increased infant mortality, and created a negative net population growth rate.

Russians Learn There Is a War On in Afghanistan

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1983

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 2 — Soviet citizens accustomed to reading about their soldiers distributing rice or helping build a new life in Afghanistan have begun to learn that their men in the "limited contingent" there are facing hardships, danger and even death.

A number of articles, particularly in February, have marked a shift in press coverage from the previous sparse diet of glowing accounts.

Instead, the public has been offered reports on a lieutenant shot dead in an ambush, on infantrymen feasting on knishes in the shadow of the armored personnel carrier on the eve of a hazardous mission, on the Islamic insurgents plunging Kabul into darkness by sabotaging power lines, on Russian nurses stranded in dangerous outposts, or on a popular rock group refusing to travel to distant bases.

The coverage is still remote from anything resembling a credible picture of what the soldiers are doing in Afghanistan or why. The Soviet force is described only as doing its "international duty" against counterrevolutionaries waging an "undeclared war" at the behest of the United States, China, Pakistan and Egypt. Nothing is published about the size of the force, the operations it conducts, the scope of the opposition or the casualties.

The difference has been in an attempt to give some feeling for the conditions and dangers of Afghanistan, with sweltering lowlands and freezing mountain passes, stalking rebels, loneliness, nostalgia and the other travails of men in combat far from home.

The trade union daily Trud, for example, depicted the heroic death of a young infantry lieutenant and aspiring poet, killed while trying to hold off guerrillas. Krasnaya Zvezda, the armed forces daily, wrote of a decorated sergeant preparing to lead a column through three rebel-infested provinces.

These and other soldiers are shown, if not in combat roles, at least in military roles — as infantrymen, sappers, sentries. And the terms used seem to echo military activities, with "counterrevolutionaries" giving way to "basmachi," a term used in the 1920's for anti-Soviet guerrillas in Central Asia, or "dushman," the Afghan word for insurgent.

Some Soviet press accounts, though disparaging the Afghan rebels' claim to uphold Islam, have even cited their term for Soviet soldiers — "nevernye," meaning "infidels."

The unusual expansion of Soviet press coverage followed the ascendancy to power of Yuri V. Andropov, and Western diplomats suggest that it may reflect the wishes of the military establishment, eager to receive some credit for a major and costly operation.

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
By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

It was nearly three years ago that Zia Nassry, a United States citizen and New York businessman, was seized from room 805 in the Teheran Hilton Hotel by three armed and masked men.

He said he was blindfolded and interrogated for a day before he was declared guilty of espionage and sabotage and ordered to be shot. His abductors ordered him to write his will, which he did, asking among other things that his papers be given to the Middle East study center at Harvard University.

Mr. Nassry, who said he came to the United States as a student in 1963 and became a naturalized citizen in 1977, was seized in Teheran on March 11, 1980, as he awaited discussions with Iranian authorities on the plight of Afghan refugees. He said he had made "a colossal error in judgment" by thinking that as a Moslem, a fluent speaker of Persian and an advocate of the Afghan cause he would be secure in Iran's revolutionary turbulence.

Mr. Nassry, whose father, Nasrullah Khan, once reportedly served King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan as chief of intelligence, had often visited Teheran and in 1979 he met Ayatollah Khomeini in the holy city of Qum. A year later he returned as the head of the Islamic and



The New York Times/Marilyn K. Yee

Zia Nassry last week at his apartment in Manhattan.

Nationalist Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, a group seeking to develop unity between the various guerrilla factions.

He admits having had sympathy for the Iranian revolutionaries, though he explained that one reason he had returned to Teheran was to try to tell officials that the continuing detention of the United States Embassy hostages was hurting efforts to rally support for the Afghans in the non-Islamic West.

He said he also had hoped to raise questions about reports that Soviet tanks were cutting across Khorasan Province in Iran to take up positions at the Shindand Air Base in Afghanistan. Finally he had hoped to cross into western Afghanistan to deliver \$25,000 to guerrillas to construct clinics.

American Tells of Long Ordeal in Iran Prisons

NYT
1/17

AFGHANISTAN: THREE YEARS OF OCCUPATION is the fourth report written by Eliza van Hollen of the Bureau of Research & Intelligence, US Dept. of State, on Afghanistan. Excerpts from the report dated December 1982 follow:

Soviet Military Offensive Intensified

The initial increment of 5,000 troops in December was followed by several thousand more in January. The total number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is now estimated at 105,000. In addition, about 30,000 men on the Soviet side of the border serve in a rear-guard capacity; some of these are periodically involved directly in operations in the northern areas. The U.S.S.R. thus has a force of about 135,000 committed to the Afghan war.

Soviet military operations throughout 1982 have been more massive and more elaborate than in 1981; they appear designed not only to eradicate *mujahidin* strongholds but also to intimidate civilian supporters of the freedom fighters. The previous political strategy of wooing the population to support the regime's National Fatherland Front had been unsuccessful; by the end of last year the *mujahidin* were clearly expanding the territory under their influence. In 1982, Soviet firepower has been used much more indiscriminately as the Soviet and Afghan Armed Forces have sought to reestablish the regime's authority in key areas.

The big winter offensives against Qandahar in the south and in Parvan Province north of Kabul revealed Moscow's revised military strategy. These drives, which were followed by similarly harsh operations against many villages and towns throughout the country, inflicted heavy casualties on civilians and occasionally on the *mujahidin*. More often, however, the freedom fighters have managed to withdraw with their force relatively intact and to return to the area as soon as the Soviets have left.

Civilian populations near strategic targets have suffered the most. For example, the towns in the Shomali area immediately north of Kabul have been bombed heavily throughout the year. *Mujahidin* in this area are a threat to Kabul itself and to the important Bagram airbase as well as to traffic moving along the main supply route from Kabul to the Soviet border. Many other strategically important areas in both eastern and western Afghanistan have been subjected to repeated aerial attack, but none has been hit with the same frequency and intensity as those near the capital.

Moscow probably will try to refrain from large-scale counterattacks on the *mujahidin* inside Kabul. Although they have on occasion bombarded resistance-controlled quarters of two other cities, Qandahar and Herat, the presence of a large community of foreign

observers may inhibit them in Kabul. But the State Information Service (KHAD—the secret police) which is run by the Soviet KGB, appears to have increased its activities in Kabul in recent months in response to *mujahidin* activity in the city. Recent emigrants have described a growing police-state atmosphere in the capital.

The Soviets also appear to be concentrating their military efforts in areas which are economically important and which are essentially under *mujahidin* control. These include fertile agricultural regions and the sites of industrial enterprises that have been disabled by the guerrillas in districts surrounding the major cities—Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

Other Soviet military activity during the past year apparently has been intended to discourage movement across the Pakistani and Iranian borders; it does not appear to have succeeded. Soviet forces also have been engaged in equally unfruitful efforts to suppress the resistance in the northern provinces along the Soviet border.

Soviet Casualties and Morale. Because of the shift to larger scale operations in 1982, Soviet casualties began to rise. To keep casualties low, the Soviets made heavy use of air bombardments and forced Afghan military units to spearhead the ground attacks.

The new spate of casualties may be causing morale problems for the Soviets. In November, *Krasnaya Zvezda* carried an unusual, only slightly veiled, reference to Soviet casualties, indicating a need to acknowledge the sacrifices made by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In an interview with a *Krasnaya Zvezda* correspondent, a member of Afghanistan's Politburo claimed that Soviet soldiers had now won the trust of the Afghan people, but he added that it had been won "at a great price." He went on to thank "the Soviet servicemen for their courage, selflessness and genuine internationalism." This admission went beyond the candid statement in *Krasnaya Zvezda* last February that life for the Soviet troops in Afghanistan "is hard . . . sometimes very, very hard." The November statement may have been spurred by the large death toll of Soviet soldiers from asphyxiation following an accident in the Salang tunnel on November 3.

Accounts of indiscipline, drug usage, and black marketeering—including the sale of weapons and ammunition—are numerous. Throughout the Soviet occupation, there have been periodic reports of defections to the *mujahidin* by

Soviet minority troops, particularly the Tadjiks who have important cultural and ethnic links with Afghan Tadjiks. These defections seem to have increased during 1982.

Soviet commanders in Afghanistan are under heavy pressure from Moscow to produce results against an enemy the frequently outwits and outwits them and that enjoys the support of the vast majority of Afghans. Thus when the Soviets fail to track down the *mujahidin*, they turn on civilians in frustration and rage. The Swedish journalist Borge Almqvist has described in detail crimes perpetrated by Soviet soldiers against Afghan citizens in Lowgar Province, which he visited during the summer. The Bertrand Russell Tribunal has publicized similar evidence of Soviet brutality.

The Afghan Army

A major obstacle to Soviet military success against the *mujahidin* is Moscow's continuing inability to rebuild the Afghan Army. Not only is there a persistent shortage of recruits, but the loyalty of the officer corps remains in serious doubt.

Within the officer corps, Parchami loyalists are in a minority. They are outnumbered by disillusioned and alienated nonparty careerists and by Khalqis who bear a grudge against the dominant Parchamis. The elections preceding the national party conference in March confirmed the numerical edge which the Khalqis hold over the Parchamis among the officers.

Moscow hopes that increasing numbers of officers who have been trained recently in the Soviet Union will help create a more loyal force. The Soviets also may expect that the sons of party members now being rushed through officer training courses in Kabul will be more reliable. But the long list of Afghan officers who have defected includes many who received training in the Soviet Union.

Moscow also counted on General Abdul Qader, who was acting Minister of Defense during most of 1982 and officially appointed as Minister in September, to narrow the division in the military establishment between Khalqis and Parchamis. Qader has ties with both factions and has been described as more of a "nationalist" than a party man. Yet his appointment in place of General Rafi who was an ardent Parchami, has not generated much support from nonparty and Khalqi officers.

On the contrary, there are many signs that officers in the Afghan Army


continue to collaborate with the *mujahidin*. Large number of Khalq officers were arrested in Jalalabad in March and in Ghazni Province in April, suggesting extensive plotting against the regime. Following the Panjsher campaign in early summer, reports circulated that several high-ranking officers had been arrested for collaborating with Mahsud. And in late September, General Wodud, commander of the Central Corps, was found shot to death in his office. He may have been killed either by the Parchamis or by enraged Soviets on suspicion of collusion with the *mujahidin*. Throughout the year, Afghan commanders have had their assignments shifted frequently—as if their Soviet overseers were trying to forestall the development of sympathetic ties between commanders and local *mujahidin*.

In a speech to the Armed Forces guidance and administration leadership cadre on August 12, Babrak Karmal was highly critical of the army's performance. He singled out irresponsibility with weapons (perhaps prompted by the large loss of materiel to the *mujahidin* in the Panjsher), the ineffectiveness of some combat units, the failure of officers to lead and inspire their men, and the lack of cooperation between the army and other security organizations. Babrak ascribed these problems to inadequate political indoctrination in the army and, by implication, to party factionalism. He stated that "unity . . . and the solidarity of party ranks in the army was of vital and national importance."


The shortage of Afghan troops may be even more significant for Kabul than the shortage of reliable officers. The regime has been unable to build an army of more than 30,000–40,000 men; it loses about 10,000 men annually through desertions and 5,000 through casualties. The year 1982 began with an urgent need to replace some 20,000 men who were released from service in December 1981 after completion of their extended tours. Extensive sweep operations were held throughout the country to obtain replacements. Those caught in the dragnet included many persons with valid claims to exemption. Similar sweeps were conducted in the spring and early summer but with little success.

In late July, the regime again revised the draft law. The tour of duty for regular recruits was extended by 6 months to 3 years. Reservists who had been inducted following the September 1981 mobilization had their present tours extended from 1 to 2 years, and another large class of reservists became eligible for active duty when the age ceiling was raised from 35 to 39.

The reaction in the armed forces was predictable: a perceptible increase in desertions. Indeed, the draft law changes appeared to have the immediate effect of causing a net loss of army personnel despite the sweep operations. To



The Kabul/Panjsher Valley Area



Map prepared by Laura Wasko, Office of The Geographer

counter this hemorrhaging, the regime announced higher pay for soldiers and noncommissioned officers during their third year of duty.

In October, in a further indication of the troop shortage, the regime decided to violate traditional custom by drafting men from the Shinwari, Mohmand, and Jaji tribes who inhabit areas adjacent to Pakistan. The decision also may have reflected the regime's awareness that these tribes were not preventing cross-border traffic in their area—the quid pro quo for the draft exemption. But when the tribesmen staged a large demonstration in Kabul in early November in protest to the draft, the government reversed its decision.

Rumors of a government plan to create a civil defense corps of boys (ages 16-18) and older men (ages 40-45) to perform guard duty have greatly alarmed the populace. Younger boys (ages 10-15) are to receive military training at school to prepare them for such responsibilities. As much of the police force is tied down with guard duty, the civil defense plan would free police for combat. Many of the 16-18 year-olds already have been conscripted even though they are under the legal draft age of 19. The plan allegedly is to go into effect in March 1983.

Consolidation of All Security Organizations

Morale and disciplinary problems have afflicted other security organs—the Defense of the Revolution (DOR) militia, the police, and the secret police. The DOR militia is supposed to be a force of selected party loyalists, but its members are often young, opportunistic, and easily demoralized; they have a poor record of performance under stress. There is also much bickering among the different services, including fighting between the police and the KHAD in Kabul.

The Soviets and the regime recognize the advantage of imposing more centralized control on the security apparatus. The "Action Program," adopted at the party conference in March, called for establishing a "unified single defense system of . . . armed forces, frontier forces, security organs, groups of defenders of revolution and volunteer groups of tribes." It also called for "tight party control over the . . . activities of this system as a whole."

The plan to consolidate all security forces under centralized party direction has run into political and bureaucratic resistance. In speeches to KHAD personnel in May, to army cadres in August, and to the police in October, Babrak Karmal criticized all the services for their lack of cooperation. His complaints, however, are unlikely to have much effect. For example the top Khalki leader, Gulabzoi, who as Minister of the

Interior controls the police, probably sees the consolidation as a Parcham move to undermine his position; indeed, there are signs that Gulabzoi is continuing to try to build the police into a parallel "army" under his control.

Problems in the Party

The first national conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took place in mid-March 1982. In addition, three Central Committee plenums were held—the eighth in March to prepare for the national conference, the ninth in July, and the tenth in December. The first three meetings revealed that the fundamental conflicts between the Khalki and Parcham factions of the party are as serious as ever.

The conference sponsors probably hoped that the conference would establish the dominance of the Parcham wing and thus would further legitimize Babrak's leadership. The two main items on the agenda—changes in the party constitution and an action program to give the party a sense of direction—both seem to have been designed to reduce Khalki influence.

The Khalki leadership, however, turned the two-stage process of electing delegates to the conference into a contest punctuated by fistfights and shoot-outs, instead of accepting elections rigged in favor of Parcham candidates. The results confirmed that in spite of repeated purges of lower and middle-level Khalkis, the latter still outnumber their rivals—at least among full-fledged members eligible to participate in the election process. . .

During much of 1981 and particularly in early 1982, in the weeks immediately preceding the conference, the Parcham leadership engaged in an intensive drive to recruit new members. The purpose was twofold: to legitimize the party's claim to governing Afghanistan by giving it a larger membership and to neutralize the influence of the Khalkis.

By the time of the conference, a combination of coercion and enticements had netted the party enough new recruits to enable it for the first time to announce a membership figure: 62,000. At the ninth plenum in July, Babrak claimed that the number had increased to 70,000. Many observers estimate the membership at about 35,000-40,000.

About half of the members are in the Armed Forces. In August, Babrak said that there were 20,000 members in the army and that "the army party organization forms the greatest part of the PDPA." This figure would include members in the officer corps, which is predominantly Khalki, and new members among conscripts—a captive group that has provided the Parchamis with a large portion of their new re-

cruits. Many of these persons defect from the party at the same time they defect from the army. (Even if the party's figure of about 62,000 members is correct, they would constitute only 4% of Afghanistan's population, estimated at about 15 million before the Soviet invasion.)

Problems in the Economy

Both Kabul and Moscow publicly claim that Afghanistan has made considerable economic and social progress in spite of "interference" by the forces of "imperialism." In their own speeches, however, Afghan officials have expressed great concern over the continuing economic deterioration. For example, Babrak emphasized to the PDPA conference in March and again to the party plenum in July that "the economic front bears no less importance than the battle front." Babrak continually stresses that the breakdown of the Afghan economy is a political problem that party members should solve. The regime is hoping to use improved economic conditions to generate popular support for the government, but the economy cannot be revived while so much of the countryside is under *mujahidin* control.

Afghanistan's economy rests primarily on agriculture. Over four-fifths of the population lives in rural areas. Reasonably good weather over the last few years has left the farmers in some areas not much worse off than they were before the Soviet invasion. Agricultural production, however, has fallen sharply. About 3 million Afghans (one-fifth of the population) have fled the country, most coming from rural areas and taking about 3 million animals with them. In areas of heavy fighting, including many of Afghanistan's most fertile valleys, crops have been destroyed or lost through lack of irrigation and cultivation. In the areas controlled by the *mujahidin*, what is produced is not shipped to urban markets, although this year military forces have appropriated harvested crops for the regime. As a result of the decline in agricultural production and problems of distribution, the Soviet Union has had to supply food and other commodities to meet the basic needs of the cities, notably Kabul.

Kabul's food problem this year has been greatly exacerbated by a large influx of refugees fleeing from nearby towns and villages that have been heavily bombed by the Soviets. The population of Kabul has more than doubled since before the war to about 1.8 million. Although the authorities have tried to introduce price controls, recent emigrants report that basic commodities are in very short supply and that prices have skyrocketed.

In his campaign to win the support of the peasants, Babrak has outlined a program of land reform. The main innovation in this plan—as compared to the program applied by the Taraki regime in 1979 that stimulated the early growth of the resistance movement—is to accompany redistribution of land with the water rights needed to irrigate it. In conjunction with this program, Afghan and Soviet planners are seeking to restore damaged irrigation systems in 11 provinces.

The *mujahidin* have resisted these efforts. Preliminary phases of a pilot project in Deh Sabz district (adjacent to Kabul) have provoked strong opposition. There is little likelihood, therefore, that this project will be carried out, despite predictions of Babrak and his prime minister that agricultural production would rise as much as 3.1% for the Afghan calendar year (March 1982–March 1983).

The situation is no better in Afghanistan's small industrial sector. Emigration has seriously reduced the work force (both skilled and nonskilled), the transportation network is in disarray, and the *mujahidin* have shut down many factories and virtually all development projects. At the party conference in March, Babrak listed government enterprises that have been disabled by the resistance, including "the cement factory in Herat, the textile mills in Herat and Qandahar, sugar factories and irrigation establishments." He stressed the importance of putting these plants back in operation, but there is no indication as of late fall that this has happened.

At the same conference, Prime Minister Keshntmand outlined an ambitious program of economic growth. He predicted a general increase in production of 6.3% with industrial growth of 10.3%, during the period from March 1982 to March 1983. These projections were predicated on 63 new projects to be carried out mostly with Soviet aid. The plan was based on the assumption that the more aggressive military strategy for 1982 would neutralize the *mujahidin* and reestablish the regime's authority in the provinces.

It was clear by late August that the military strategy was not working and that economic objectives were not being achieved. Keshntmand admitted to the Council of Ministers that performance during the first quarter of the year (March 21–June 21) was unsatisfactory. He indicated particular concern about shortcomings in the development of fuel resources, electricity, and minerals and raw materials. In particular, he mentioned the importance of increasing coal production as well as expanding oil and gas works, of getting started on the

Aynak copper mine project in Lowgar Province, and of assuring adequate electricity for Kabul. Babrak's mid-year report to the Council of Ministers on October 3 indicated similar concern over these particular areas of the economy.

The stress on improving key sectors of the economy has been accompanied by high-level personnel shifts. Last spring, Prime Minister Keshntmand relinquished the planning portfolio to Dr. Khalil Ahmad Abawi, a professional planner. Keshntmand, however, retains special responsibilities in the economic sphere. The Ministry of Power and Irrigation was split in May into two entities, presumably a reflection of the importance attached to these areas. The former Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform, Abdul Ghafer Lakanwal, was elevated to the post of Minister.

Afghanistan's natural gas industry is the only sector of the economy that functions more or less normally. Almost all of the gas produced from fields located near the Soviet border and developed by the U.S.S.R. in the early 1960s is exported to the U.S.S.R. The nominal price increases negotiated since the occupation are all that keeps Afghanistan's economic statistics from being worse than they are. Part of the earnings from sales of natural gas is applied to repayments on the outstanding debt to the Soviet Union; the remainder is registered as credits in the barter accounting system for trade between the two countries. In this way, Afghanistan derives no hard currency benefit from its major export.

The Afghan economy continues to be tied tightly to that of the Soviet Union. An agreement signed in April 1981 called for trebling trade between the two countries during 1981–1985, as compared to the previous 5 years. Afghanistan's development plans are worked out by Soviet advisers; the emphasis on the development of fuel and mineral resources appears to have been dictated by Soviet requirements.

In mid-November, Babrak, speaking to a World Peace Council conference in Kabul on socioeconomic development, reviewed socioeconomic achievements in Afghanistan. Most of the projects he listed are far behind schedule or at a standstill. The two that have been completed are conspicuous for their importance to Moscow: a new bridge linking the two countries over the Amu Darya River that was rushed to completion in May, a year ahead of schedule; and a satellite communication and television receiving system, inaugurated in late February. This system gives Moscow an important communications link and the opportunity to project its political propaganda into Afghanistan.

Nationality and Tribal Policy

Both Kabul and Moscow attach particular importance to the regime's nationality and tribal policy. This policy, implemented by Minister of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs Sulaiman Laeq, tries to exploit ethnic and tribal self-interest to win support from Afghanistan's diverse peoples. The seventh party plenum in December 1981 issued a special message to the tribes, and during the past year the regime has continued to try to exploit tribal sensibilities.

An important element in the regime's strategy is the effort to win over the tribes through cash, weapons, and privileges. These tactics appeared to be having some success at various times in 1982. Certain tribes seemed to lose their enthusiasm for the resistance and are said to have agreed to arrangements by which they would be exempted from the draft in return for guarding the border.

In most cases, however, tribal acceptance of regime blandishments has proved to be temporary and tactical. Tribes in Paktia Province near the Pakistani border rebelled twice during the year to turn back Soviet and Afghan forces that were trying to close off access to Pakistan. Likewise, tribes in Konar Province, adjoining Pakistan, resumed armed resistance after allegedly having been neutralized by the regime. More recently, the regime provoked demonstrations when it tried to draft men who belonged to the border tribes in Paktia and Nangarhar Provinces.

The Afghan Refugees

In the period since the April 1978 Marxist coup in Kabul triggered the flow of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan, more than 2.7 million people have registered with the Pakistani authorities. This figure emerges from the reenumeration of the refugee population conducted by the Pakistan Government in 1982.

Refugees continue to enter Pakistan at a steady pace. The numbers have declined, probably reflecting the fact that many villagers close to Pakistan became refugees in the early stages of the war, while resistance leaders farther away from the border have urged the local population to stay in their villages. Also, victims of the war in the interior have moved to Kabul and other cities. In October, however, authorities in Pakistan noted a rise in refugees arriving in Pakistan, including people coming for the first time from the Panjshir Valley. . .

The refugee population in Iran is estimated at between 500,000 and 1 million. Over 4,000 refugees of Turkic origin were resettled from Pakistan to

CHRONOLOGY

12/12 - Radio Kabul reported that about 100 insurgents were killed in a battle with troops in Badakhshan; Karmal opened the 10th plenum of the PDP; Gen. Abdul Kadir was elected Defense Minister. FEER 12/17

12/13 - A 6-member Soviet tennis team visited Kabul under an agreement between the Olympic Committees of the USSR and the DRA. Bakhtar

12/14 - Gulbudin Hekmatyr stated that the USSR had launched a massive military expansion program in Afghanistan including the emplacement of missiles with nuclear warhead capacity. The missiles are in the Wakhan Corridor and the Soviets have built three tunnels there and erected radar and communications monitoring facilities. Xinhua News Agency stated that Gulbudin received this information from Afghan army defectors but that there was no other confirmation of these claims. China Daily

- Hundreds of Afghan civilians were killed in week-long Soviet air raids in Western Herat according to western diplomats in Islamabad. FEER 12/17

12/18 - An earthquake killed 6 people in a mine in northern Afghanistan. NYT
- The China Daily notes a statement in Pravda saying that the Moscow-backed "Afghan revolution" was irreversible. The same article carried the following:

Meanwhile, the former deputy head of Afghanistan's secret police, General Ghulam Siddiq Miraki, told Agence France-Presse on Thursday from his Pakistani exile that the Kabul Administration employed 25,000 secret agents, including those infiltrated into Iran and Pakistan.

The general, who claims he all along worked for the Afghan fundamentalist Islamic opposition, said the Soviet Union has lost more than 40,000 men since its invasion two years ago.

Siddiq made international headlines earlier this week with statements to Britain's BBC that Moscow planned to annex all or part of Afghanistan.

In Thursday's interview, the general specified that the late Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev, according to "high-level Afghan and Soviet sources in Kabul", planned incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet Union last spring.

In the face of the stubborn resistance to Babrak Karmal's Kabul Administration, the general went on, the Kremlin later envisioned annexing only Afghanistan's eight northern provinces and pulling out of the rest of the country.

This solution was still being considered by Moscow, the general asserted.

12/20 - Karmal, in Russia for the 60th anniversary of the USSR, said that until the fighting ended in Afghanistan his government would continue to make use of its right to Soviet military aid. The Soviet troops are a "reserve force which will only come into action if there is massive interference from outside. We can say proudly that the Afghan armed forces are quite capable of successfully conducting independent combat operations." He dismissed a defector's claim that there was a Soviet plan to annex all or part of Afghanistan. He said "Moscow had never raised the idea of annexation and if any 'lunatic' in Afghanistan had suggested it against the will of the Afghan people, then the Kremlin would have rejected it." DO 12/30

- When Karmal, in Moscow, was asked if he might step down as Afghan leader, he said: "From our standpoint putting such a question is not legitimate. I did not come to power like the leader of some military junta as the result of a military coup."

International Herald Tribune

- The China Daily reports that about 100,000 Afghan guerrillas are fighting the Soviets; the Soviets have suffered 20,000 casualties in the battlefield; the Kremlin spends \$6 million per day to maintain its occupation of Afghanistan.

12/21 - Karmal, still in Moscow, announced that national income rose by 2.4% over the past year while wheat production increased 5.4%. "The wages of the working people rose considerably." Press release, Afghan Information Service.

12/22 - The Czech news agency CTK reported that the Afghan government plans to deploy new security units along the Pakistan-Afghan border. The new units will be composed of "volunteers," troops of the regular Afghan army and "guardians" of the revolution. Their mission is to block counter-revolutionary infiltration. DO

12/23 - The US State Dept. announced that Soviet casualties in Afghanistan were between 10 & 15 thousand. A spokesman said that Soviet forces in the country had increased from 85,000 to 105,000 and that 30,000 more troops were stationed on the Soviet side of the border. NYT

(Spellings in the chronology are as they appear in the source material. -Ed.)

Turkey in 1982, including a tribe of Kirghiz nomads from the Wakhan corridor. About 4,000 Afghan refugees were admitted to the United States during fiscal year 1982.

Long-Term Soviet Prospects

The most urgent Soviet priority in Afghanistan during 1982 has been the pursuit of its military objectives: eliminating the *mujahidin* forces and keeping the Afghan people from supporting the resistance. But Moscow also pursues a long-range policy of stimulating a more favorable political climate for itself and its proteges. A key element of this policy is the development of loyal cadres of young people through Sovietization of the Afghan educational system and extensive educational and training programs for Afghans in the Soviet Union.

Estimates of the number of Afghans currently studying in the U.S.S.R. vary from 6,000-10,000. This program, however, does not always achieve its purposes. Afghan students have encountered hostility from Soviet citizens angered by the loss of Soviet lives in Afghanistan. Some students have clashed with Soviet police.

Last summer, as in the two preceding years, a large number of Afghan children (1,200 in 1982) went to summer camp in the Soviet Union. Parents have complained about political indoctrination courses at these camps and also about Soviet and regime efforts to use children as informers.

Moscow is creating an infrastructure of Soviet-style institutions in Afghanistan on which it counts to mold the people in the Soviet image. The Soviets hope that key organizations, such as the National Fatherland Front, gradually will take root.

The regime's nationality and tribal policy also is part of Moscow's long-term strategy. And Babrak's major effort to coopt religious leaders undoubtedly reflects Soviet direction. . .

Moscow continues to pursue its long-term objective of wearing down international resistance to the Babrak regime. A central element in this effort is to build up Babrak's international image and to strengthen ties between his regime and other receptive governments, primarily countries of Eastern Europe. In late May 1982, Babrak visited East Berlin and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the German Democratic Republic. In early October, he went to Hungary and signed a similar treaty. These visits followed trips to Bulgaria (December 1981), Czechoslovakia (June 1981), and Moscow (October 1980). The Soviets clearly hope that by keeping Babrak on the world stage, they can eventually persuade the international community to accept him as a legitimate head of government.

Regime officials, with Soviet assistance, have made great efforts to develop relations with the nonaligned world. Foreign Minister Dost has been actively seeking friends in the Middle East and South Asia but without signal success. In India, whose criticism of the Soviet invasion has been restrained, his approaches have produced mixed results. India agreed to revive a joint Indian-Afghan commission on economic, technical, and commercial relations, and in May signed a protocol envisaging a modest program of trade and technical assistance. Subsequently Mrs. Gandhi became more outspoken about the need for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and made a statement to this effect at her press conference in Moscow in September. . .

Indeed, the spotlight on Afghanistan grows brighter each year. The number of journalists and photographers who have traveled inside Afghanistan with the *mujahidin* has increased, as has coverage in the international press and on television. Such events as the Florence Colloquium on Afghanistan and international observances of Afghanistan Day, both in March 1982, and the Bertrand Russell Tribunal meeting in Paris in December 1982 all serve to emphasize the importance of the issue. Nevertheless, the international publicity is periodic, while the suffering of the Afghan people is constant. The discrepancy between the magnitude of the tragedy and the international attention it receives works very much to Moscow's advantage.

"THE AFGHANS SENT IT TO CELEBRATE OUR THIRD ANNIVERSARY HERE"



ORGANIZATIONS

Descriptions used in this listing are those provided by the organization. Listing does not imply endorsement by The Afghanistan Forum. This list is by no means complete and we hope readers who know of other organizations will send us the organization's address.

A.F.A.R. (Aid for Afghan Refugees, Inc.)
1052 Oak Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
415-863-1450
John Schaecher, President

We are committed to participate in refugee relief activities only, cooperating with other groups which have similar goals and which have the capabilities to provide direct aid and to operate effectively in the Afghan cultural context.

AFAR Newsletter - issued twice/yr. - free
Photos-of-Afghanistan post cards - \$1 each

AFGHAN COMMUNITY IN AMERICA
139-15 95th Avenue
Jamaica, NY 11435
212-658-3737
Habibullah Mayar, Chairman



Refugee relief of Afghans in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Organization also coordinates rallies and demonstrations in the NY area.)

AFGHANISTAN FORUM, INC.
201 East 71st Street, 2K
New York, NY 10021
212-861-4272
Mary Ann Siegfried, Exec. Director

Issues Newsletter in January, March, June and September; Occasional Papers as available; to provide as wide a variety of information on Afghanistan as possible to as many people as possible.

AFGHANISTAN INFORMATION CENTER
Freedom House
20 West 40th Street
New York, NY 10018
212-730-7744
Rosanne Klass, Director



A comprehensive source of expert information on Afghanistan.
Issues news releases, occasional newsletters; arranges press conferences and briefings.

AFGHANISTAN INFORMATION CENTER
55/B Jamal-ud-din Afghani Road
University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan
40953 (telephone); AFIC (cable)
Sayd Majrooh, Director

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

AIC Monthly Bulletin - \$60/yr.
Briefs newsmen and others on Afghan situation

AFGHANISTAN RELIEF COMMITTEE
Suite 4100
345 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
212-355-2931
Gordon A. Thomas, President

Refugee relief for Afghans.
Through the media and in meetings with concerned groups in the US & abroad, the Committee seeks to keep the Afghan cause active.

AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE
18, Charing Cross Road
London WC2N, Great Britain
01-379-7218
Viscount Cranborne MP, Chairman
Iaian Picton, Executive Director

Relief inside Afghanistan and in Pakistani refugee camps; information, political pressure for Afghan freedom.

AIDE MEDICALE INTERNATIONALE
119, rue des Amandiers
75020 Paris, France
636-66-10

Medical assistance in country and medical training programs in country.

AMERICAN AID FOR AFGHANS
6443 S.W. Beaverton Highway
Portland, OR 97221
503-297-4743
Don Weidenweber, President

Aid to freedom fighters; currently all donations go to support Radio Free Kabul.

AMERICAN AID FOR AFGHANS...continued

"The Best of Afghan Cookery" - \$5
Afghan socks - \$15/pr.

AMERICAN FRIENDS OF AFGHAN PHYSICIANS
1001 West 10th Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202
317-630-7044
Joseph J. Mamlin, President

Monitoring health care services inside
Afghanistan and among the refugees. In
some instances partial support is pro-
vided to Afghan physicians, both in the
US and in refugee areas.
Annual report circulated to donors only.

ARIN (Afghan Refugee Information Network)
85, Marylebone High Street
London W1, Great Britain
01-874-1562 & 01-487-4583

Channels funds to Afghanistan Support
Committee, Panjsheri Resistance, Radio
Free Kabul Committee, the Afghan Society
of the UK, etc.
Bi-monthly Newsletter - \$1.50/issue

ASSOCIATION FOR FREEDOM OF AFGHANISTAN,
INC
18520 Crownover Court
Dallas, TX 75252
214-596-8620
Hamidullah Hamid, President

To help refugees coming to the Dallas
area; job assistance, information, etc.
"Free Afghanistan" bumper stickers - \$2

AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE FOR AFGHAN
REFUGEES
Salztorgasse 7/6
A-1010 Vienna, Austria
63-40-885
and
1 Tariq Lane GPO Box 489
Peshawar Pakistan
76-0-84
Dr. Alfred Janata, Chairman

refugee relief, social services, schooling,
basic health education, income generating
activities.

BIBLIOTHECA AFGHANICA
Schweizerisches Afghanistan-Archiv.
Oberer Burghaldenweg 31
CH 4410 Liestal, Switzerland
061-94-68-17
P. Bucherer-Dietschi, Director

Scientific documentation and information
on Afghanistan, its geography, history
and culture.

Newspaper clippings from German language
press (since 1977); Afghanistan biblio-
graphy (on cards); occasional monographs.

BUREAU INTERNATIONAL AFGHANISTAN
24, Rue de Chaligny
75012 Paris, France
307-15-67

Jean Paul Gay, Secretary
Information; international coordination
of the political and humanitarian effort.

"Letter from the BIA" (in French or English),
6 times/yr. 100 FFR.
The organization also has posters.

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
PROGRAM

475 Riverside Drive, Room 666
New York, NY 10027
212-870-2164
Dale de Haan, Director
Melvin Lehman, Info. Officer, I & R Prog.

Resettling refugees into the US; provides
information and advocacy on refugee issues.

"Refugee & Human Rights Newsletter"
"Manual for Refugee Sponsorship"
"Afghanistan: A Portrait, a guide for
resettling Afghan Refugees"



COMITE SUISSE DE SOUTIEN AU PEUPLE AFGHAN
24 avenue de la Gare
2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland
Yann Richter, President

Information and refugee relief.
"Afghanistan Info" (in French & German)

COMMITTEE FOR A FREE AFGHANISTAN
1237 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003
202-546-7577
Karen McKay, Executive Director

A project of the Council for the Defense of Freedom and a member of the Coalition for Peace through Strength.
Information, especially to Congress and the media; briefings; reports.

"Afghanistan Report" - \$20/yr
documentary films

DIRECT RELIEF INTERNATIONAL
P.O. Box 30820
Santa Barbara, CA 93105
805-687-3694
Kathryn L. Cody, Dir. of Programs

Refugee medical relief.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF NEW JERSEY
880 Bergen Avenue
Jersey City, NJ 07306
201-653-3888
Dr. Nicholas V. Montaldo, Exec. Director

Provides a broad range of services to immigrants and refugees including resettlement assistance, ESL training, job counseling, interpreter and translation services.

"New Jersey Mosaic" - quarterly, free

ISLAMIC UNITY OF AFGHANISTAN MUJAHIDEEN
5509 Harvey Lane
Alexandria, VA 22312
703-642-5646
M. Nabi Salehi, Director

Refugee relief both inside and outside Afghanistan; campaign to attract political, spiritual and financial support of the people and government authorities in the US for the cause of Afghanistan.

"News Bulletin of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen" published in Peshawar. (The group does plan a US publication.)



ITTIHADIA-I-MOJAHIDIN-E-ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN
Alamdar Road
P.O. Box 278
Quetta, Pakistan
73686 (telephone); "Hazarajat Quetta" - (cable

To work and struggle for the achievement of the independence of our country and to bring it back its proper position among other independent nations of the world.

KOMITEE AFGHANISTAN VRIJ
Gravenstraat 8
1012 NM Amsterdam, Holland
020-237509
Drs. Roelof Munneke, Vice Chairman



Informs the Dutch public about developments in Afghanistan and provides medical & humanitarian help to people inside Afghanistan.

20-page bi-monthly magazine in Dutch.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

36 West 44th Street
New York, NY 10036
212-921-2160

Michael Posner, Exec. Director
Arthur Helton, Dir., Political Asylum Proj.



A non-profit public interest law center based in New York, working in the area of human rights, refugee and asylum law.

LES AMIS DE L'AFGHANISTAN
B.P. 187
75864 Paris Cedex 18, France
16 (37) 50-19-87
Oliver Roy

To provide information about Afghanistan through the press, conferences and academic work. Members must make one trip into Afghanistan each year.

SOCIETY FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
P.O. Box 131
Oxford, OX1 2NJ, Great Britain
S. Enders Wimbush, Director

A center for initiating & coordinating research; a repository for research materials; published scholarly studies; enhances public awareness of Central Asia.

"Central Asian Survey" - journal \$25/yr
"Central Asian Newsletter" - 8 or 10 times/yr. \$12.50/yr.

USA FRIENDS OF AFGHANISTAN

Ghazni Hounds

313 Old Main Road

North Falmouth, MA 02556

Carlotta Wolseley, Naser Yaqubi

Information on Afghanistan primarily to owners of Afghan hounds. Funds go to several clinics on Iran-Afghan border.

Too late to alphabetize.....

AFGHANISTAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

Center for Afghan Studies

University of Nebraska at Omaha

Omaha, NE 68182

402-554-2376

Thomas Gouttierre, Exec. Secretary

To keep members and the public informed on research and on conditions and the situation in Afghanistan.

"ASA Newsletter" - quarterly

The list of organizations will be continued in the June issue.

SOVIETS LEARN

ABOUT WAR:

cont. from p. 25

According to Western estimates, more than 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been in Afghanistan for more than three years now, and the diplomats surmise that they, their relatives and the military in general must be generating pressure for recognition of their role.

"The military must chase at having to read only about troops planting flowers down there," said a diplomat who follows Afghan affairs. "They simply cannot like that image."

Catching Up With Western Radio

He said the more candid reporting may also have been caused by the need to counter rumors and Western radio broadcasts.

A report in Izvestia on Feb. 24 about three bomb explosions in Kabul, for example, merely acknowledged incidents already reported by Western radio stations and made a point of denying that Soviet saboteurs could be responsible, a rumor possibly afoot in Kabul.

The expanded coverage does not seem to reflect any great curiosity about the war among the Soviet populace in general. The war rarely comes up in conversations among Russians, and few Russians in meetings with Westerners display much interest in learning what is being reported abroad.

Some diplomats think that military cooperation with this country may be behind efforts to publicize the Afghan situation.

An example was Trud's account of the death of Lieut. Alexander I. Stovba. Like most Soviet accounts about military activities, Trud said Lieutenant Stovba had been on a training mission, and the paper used quotation marks around the words "attack" and "defense" as if to suggest maneuvers.

In the story, the detachment was ambushed in a gorge, and the lieutenant confronted the attackers alone after having ordered his men to seek safety.

The account included the "zing, zing" of bullets and described how the lieutenant was hit in an arm, the stomach and finally his heart while his comrades clambered up cliffs to his aid.

The story was unusual not only in the account of a soldier's death, of which the press has acknowledged only about half a dozen, but in the report of the posthumous honors accorded the lieutenant in his hometown of Dneprodzerzhinsk, the Ukrainian steel center.

Lieutenant's Family Background

Trud said Lieutenant Stovba's grandfather had fought against the original "basmachi" in Central Asia, and his father had served in World War II in a Red Army unit that drove the Germans from the Soviet Union to Vienna.

On Sunday, Krasnaya Zvezda, the armed forces newspaper, told about three mines being set off in Kabul on the eve of Soviet Army Day, which falls on Feb. 23, and about calls for a general strike that the paper said went unheeded. It said that guerrillas had placed the mines in areas where Soviet soldiers were not likely to be to insure that the casualties would be Afghan civilians.

"It was a primitive scheme," the paper said. "intended to set Afghans against the Soviet people. It was as if they said, 'Behold, countrymen, the Russians are celebrating while you are mourning your dead, victims of the holy war against the infidels.'"

Describing Kabul, the paper cast unusual light on the Soviet military presence. On the streets, it said, brightly colored buses and trucks mingle with Soviet jeeps, while a bridge across the Kabul River is manned by the police and Soviet soldiers. The paper spoke of dangers outside Kabul — mines uncovered by Soviet patrols, a sergeant preparing for dangerous convoy duty.

Among the more unusual press reports was one about the visit of the Blue Guitars, a Moscow rock group. Army officers complained in a letter to the editor that not only did the group produce noise with no ideological content, but it kept complaining about accommodations and, under various pretexts, refused to visit remote and presumably dangerous outposts.

A followup to the letter said the Blue Guitars had conceded their wrongdoing and had been penalized by being barred from foreign tours and from appearing in Moscow.

NYT 3/3

(See p.28)



12/23 - Karmal met with Yuri Andropov in Moscow. They "noted with satisfaction that profound social and economic transformations in the interests of the broad masses of the people are being implemented in Afghanistan under the guidance of the PDP; the national patriotic unity of the Afghan people is growing stronger in the struggle for new life." Bakhtar

12/24 - A number of Afghans reportedly were arrested in Khost for allegedly planning another coup d'etat. The group was led by Bakhtar Gul, a Khalqi officer from Gorbuz. Gul escaped but others were executed. AICMB
- A jirgah was held by elders in the Daikondi district of Uruzgan. Bakhtar - FEER in its "Intelligence column states: "The new Soviet leadership is thinking of a token troop pull-out from Afghanistan on the eve of the March 1983 non-aligned summit in New Delhi. The move would be aimed at blunting any strongly worded condemnation of the Soviet Union for its military activities in Afghanistan by some member countries."

12/25 - Drew Middleton writes that intelligence sources think that Andropov has 3 options in Afghanistan. One involves "reinforcing the present occupation force with at least 3 mechanized infantry divisions , or 42,000 men" bringing the Soviet forces in Afghanistan to over 142,000 men.

"The Soviet rationale for such a reinforcement, the informants say, would be that the 40th Army could then take over all anti-insurgency operations and relegate the Afghan Army, now shrunk to about 30,000 men, to guard duties. The sources add that a more formidable Soviet force in Afghanistan might be counted upon by Moscow to discourage aid to the insurgent groups through neighboring Pakistan."

"While the amount and type of the aid is highly classified in Washington, NATO military sources report that arms bought by a power they do not identify have been moving through Pakistan to the insurgents for the last two and a half years. These arms, the sources say, include antitank and antiaircraft weapons, but all accounts agree that the number and quality of the arms fall far short of the insurgents' needs."

A second Soviet option would be to continue military operations on the present scale with continued major sweeps in the

most active areas of insurgency. A third option, believed to have been suggested by Brezhnev, would be the annexation of Afghanistan either wholly or in part:

"This month, an Afghan defector, Lieut. Gen. Ghulam Sidiq Miragi, told a British source that, soon after the 1978 intervention, the Soviet Union instructed the Karmal Government to prepare an announcement saying that, because of imperialist threats, Afghanistan had decided to become part of the Soviet Union and accept its protection. Similar reports have come out of capitals in Western Europe since last June."

Another report says that Mr. Brezhnev had an alternative plan that called for the incorporation into the Soviet Union of Afghanistan's nine northern provinces, leaving the rest as an independent Afghan state."

But this report is doubted by most Western analysts. They note that it would leave the major Soviet airfield at Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan, in jeopardy from insurgents."

That airfield and three others now being expanded are regarded by Western analysts as the most important military gains of the occupation. The Kandahar field is guarded by a triple line of wire studded with machine-gun positions and floodlighted at night."

NYT 12/25
(see 12/18
12/20)

- Gen. Moh'd Yaseen Sadiqi, president of the Political Affairs Dept. of the armed forces, visited the Panjshir and met with "soldiers, functionaries and the local organs of state power, security forces and the state information services. He distributed gifts to a number of soldiers and officers who had displayed exceptional bravery in carrying out their tasks."

Bakhtar

Bakhtar also reported that the Supreme Council of the Ulama & the Islamic Affairs Dept. issued a statement that those "carrying out a war of fratricide against the revolutionary Afghanistan on behalf of the US, Britain & China were not conducting any jihad." The message, released on the eve of the Prophet's birthday, also states that the DRA was giving generous funds from the state budget for the upkeep, maintenance and improvement of "religious institutions and clergymen."

- The DRA and the USSR signed agreements on the survey and designing of new technical and vocational schools in Kabul and Balkh Provinces. Bakhtar

- Eight security posts north of Kabul were attacked and occupied by Mujahideen. Fifteen Mujahideen were killed and 9 wounded. AICMB

12/26 - Turkish president Kenan Evren, in Pakistan after an Asian tour, said that he hoped Afghanistan would soon be free of foreign domination. DO...

12/27 - Afghan guerrillas reportedly penetrated Soviet defenses around an airport near Jalalabad destroying 2 helicopters and 4 tanks. 40 Soviet and Afghan soldiers were killed. (The attacks took place on 12/21-22) NYT
- The Hezb-i-Islami of Yunis Khalis attacked power stations and electricity pylons in Kabul plus the Soviet embassy, the Microrayan residential enclave, the Police Academy and major roads near Kabul. Kabul was plunged into darkness (the blackout reportedly lasted several weeks) and the Kabul-Jalalabad road was closed for 4 days. AICMB (see p. 15)
- The China Daily carried a report of an editorial that appeared in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) in Peking. Excerpts follow:

The editorial, published on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, says: "The Soviet aggression against Afghanistan is a major step in the USSR's global strategy for world domination."

"Afghanistan is a neighbour of China. By invading Afghanistan and massing its troops along the Afghan-Chinese border, the Soviet Union is also posing a grave threat to China's security. The Chinese people have always firmly supported the Afghan people in their just struggle and resolutely demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the Soviet troops from Afghanistan so that the Afghan people may resolve their own problems free of external interference."

On 12/28 the China Daily called on other countries to give "moral and material support" to the Afghan guerrillas to thus put pressure on the USSR to withdraw its "aggressor troops."

"A 'political solution' to the Afghan issue is possible only if the resolutions adopted at all UN general assembly sessions, the Islamic summit conferences and the non-aligned foreign ministers conferences are strictly implemented, all foreign troops are withdrawn immediately and unconditionally from Afghanistan. Afghan people are allowed to exercise their right to self-determination without external interference, the status of independence and non-alignment is restored to Afghanistan and the Afghan refugees are allowed to return to their homeland safely and with dignity. This is the only correct way to resolve the Afghan issue."

- Demonstrations and rallies were held in Tehran, Delhi, Bonn, New York City and Washington, D.C. on the 3rd anniversary of the Soviet invasion. NYT
- An Indian parliamentary delegation in Kabul met with Karmal, Dr. Anahita, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Saleh Moh'd Zeerai & Gen. Gul Aqa. An exhibition of contemporary Afghan painting to mark the 60th anniversary of the USSR opened in

Kabul. Several groups of counter-revolutionary elements were crushed near Chowki and Khar Kunar in Konar Province. Torkyalai, "a leader of the miscreants," was captured. "A number of robbers and manslaughters were also eliminated" in Dare Noor, Koz Kunar, Batikot and Ghazi Abad Farm in Shinwar. Bakhtar

12/29 - Guerrillas cut high tension wires in Chilsutoon. AICMB

12/30 - Two high-ranking Khad officials, Lt. Gen. Ghulam Siddiq Mirakay and Brig. Gen. Habibullah Hidayat, defected to Pakistan (see 12/18). Hidayat stated that more than 20,000 Khad agents had been sent to Pakistan and Iran to work in the ranks of the refugees and Mujahideen. Mirakay said that armed forces from Cuba, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic were engaged in the Afghan war along with the Soviet troops. DO

- A Soviet UN delegate said in Moscow that UN efforts should be directed toward winning support for a political settlement of the Afghan problem and not for "fanning passions." NYT

12/31 - Guerrilla groups report growing support from Soviet Moslems inside Soviet republics bordering Afghanistan. NYT

1/1 - Commentary from Bakhtar: "The year 1982 gave place to the new year of 1983 at midnight yesterday. At the threshold of the new year humanity as a whole tended to think what it would bring for it - happiness or misery, how the course of events will develop in the world and above all, whether clouds of war will gather in the sky or bright new horizons of peace will open. All mankind would wish to look at the new year with hopes for the better. Yes, all but Mr. Ronald Reagan who sits at the apex of the world capitalist system."
- Tass reported that Soviet troops would stay in Afghanistan until long-standing Soviet conditions for their withdrawal are met. NYT

1/2 - Soviet forces increased security in Kabul after guerrilla attacks on air bases, and a gunfight, in which Soviet troops mistakenly fired on Afghan soldiers, in Darulaman. NYT

1/3 - Radio Kabul, on a daily program of listeners' complaints, broadcast 5 calls from different areas of Kabul reporting that there had been 24-hour blackouts in the last 5 days.

NYT

- Sixteen Soviet advisers were captured by Mujahideen in Mazar-i-Sharif. One adviser was killed trying to escape; the other 15, 2 of whom were women, were sent to unknown destinations (see 1/25, 2/6)

AICMB

1/4 - Reportedly a group of Afghan soldiers mutinied at the Nadir Shah-kot military outpost and 12 soldiers crossed to Miran Shah on the Pakistan border. The soldiers killed 30 officers and blew up an ammunition dump. (see 1/5) NYT

- A bomb exploded at the Iqbal cinema and damaged nearby buildings. Fighting also broke out in Rishkhor between Parchamis and Kalqis. Soviet armored vehicles surrounded the area.

1/5 - The army rebellion at Nadir Shah-kot took place over the new year weekend. The China Daily had these details.

Nader Shah-Kot, 48 kilometres west of the Pakistan border, is one of a score of outposts ringing Khost, the second largest town in Paktia after Gardez, the provincial capital.

Khost, which also serves as a base for 300 Soviet advisers and their dependants, has been under guerrilla attack for over a year.

Khost itself is ringed by a minefield and is situated on a plain without cover, making it hard for the guerrillas to launch a frontal attack.

So far, at least two military outposts have fallen under guerrilla assault, resulting in streams of defectors.

Khost's only link with the rest of Afghanistan is by radio and an airstrip, which is used daily to fly in supplies from Kabul, 160 kilometres northwest.

An AP correspondent who visited the area last month was told by guerrilla leaders that they plan to attack the town in the Spring, provided they can get hold of enough weapons and ammunition for a sustained offensive.

Two weeks after he left, an airstrike was mounted on the guerrilla camp where he stayed.

Guerrilla spokesman Yaqub Mohammed Sharafat, of the Fundamentalist Yunis Khalis Group, said nine MIG jet fighters took part in the bombing operation and that 12 resistance fighters were killed or wounded.

- Radio Kabul, monitored in India, reported that several Moslem guerrillas were slain in a battle in Takhar Province. Afghan forces also captured a guerrilla leader, Niak Mohammed, and seized arms and ammunition including 13 anti-tank mines.

China Daily

- The Karmal regime invited all men with professional driving licenses to apply for training as police officers. "All interested drivers" were asked to contact the Interior Ministry immediately and to bring their driving licenses and identity cards.

China Daily

1/8 - Soviets mounted special searches in Paghman and a number of people have been "arrested and displayed on television." There have been many air attacks and 7 people in one house were killed.

AICMB

1/12 - Reports indicate that guerrillas shot down a commercial Afghan airliner in Herat in December. A key Afghan government official may have been aboard and it appeared that there were no survivors. "Sources, quoting travelers, said resistance presence remains strong in Herat, and that guerrillas routinely operate roadblocks in hopes of catching regime officials."

Arkansas Democrat

1/15 - A captured Soviet soldier was turned over to the International Red Cross and sent to Switzerland for internment. He was the 8th kept in custody under an agreement between the USSR, Switzerland, the Red Cross and the Afghan Resistance groups.

NYT

1/18 - A Tass report from Kabul said that the Afghan government is ordering workers to form armed guard units to defend their factories and farms against anti-government attacks. The special civilian defense units "are being set up across revolutionary Afghanistan to defend honorably their common property from attacks by reactionaries." The report stated that 360 workers were guarding a textile factory in Bagrami after working hours.

NYT

1/6 - The USSR strongly criticized the US State Dept. report (see p.36) and accused the US of waging an "undeclared war" against the DRA. DO

- "PPI quoted Radio Pakistan as saying on 12/24 that security arrangements made in view of the stepped up activity of the Mujahideen on the occasion of the 3rd anniversary of the Soviet armed intervention were rendered effective (sic) as the Mujahideen blew up 5 tanks in Kabul and the Soviet troops took shelter in the palace, abandoning the tanks." DO

1/19 - A report from New Delhi tells of continuing power shortages in Kabul and says that the main pipeline carrying diesel fuel from the Soviet border to Kabul was cut by guerrillas. No fuel had come through the pipeline since early December. Kabul's generators have been supplied by fuel trucked from oil depots in Doshi, 80 miles nw of Kabul, but the supply there is low. NYT
- BBC reported an assassination attempt on Sebghatullah Mojadedi in Islamabad failed. The identity of the assassins is unknown. Mojadedi was recently elected Chairman of the Islamic Alliance.

1/20 - A series of crackdowns on the drug-making industry in the NWFP has begun by Pakistani authorities after Pakistani Pres. Zia's return from his visit to the US. Representatives of the Afridi, Zaka-khel and Shinwari groups agreed to support the shutdowns but there were disagreements and some tribesmen were killed. In Jalalabad, Tribes & Nationalities Minister Suleiman Laeq, addressing a meeting on 12/6, accused the US of trying to deprive the frontier tribes of their independence and traditional livelihood. Reportedly, he offered sanctuary to the Shinwaris who wanted to carry on their narcotics enterprise. FEER

-Guerrillas fired rockets at a symbolic tank which rests on a pedestal outside the east gate of the government palace. "The tank - #254 - supposedly belonged to Aslam Watanjar, the Khalqi credited, incorrectly, with the 1978 coup." Both tank and pedestal were destroyed. AICMB
-The Pakistani ambassador to the United Arab Emirates said in a news conference on 1/12 that Pakistan had asked the USSR to close the Pakistan-Afghan border. (This was the only mention of this in the paper.) DO

- The Afghan Islamic Press reported on 1/15 that a large contingent of Soviet forces had been moved recently towards Parwan Province from Kabul. This was taken to indicate a new offensive in the Panjshir. Russian reinforcements were also reported entering Afghanistan near Torghapqa in Herat Province. DO

1/21 - UN representative Diego Cordovez arrived in Tehran to begin discussions of a political settlement of the Afghan question. DO

1/23 - A NATO report stated that Soviet aid to its client countries has made a significant drain on Moscow's limited economic resources. The Soviet Union's economic and military aid to 11 countries (including Afghanistan) is the equivalent of .4 of 1% of its GNP. The report indicated that the amount was probably close to the limits of Soviet capacity in view of other demands. NYT

1/24 - Diego Cordovez arrives in Islamabad.
- Babrak Karmal, addressing the Politburo of the CCPDP, voiced support for the UN effort to normalize relations with neighboring countries. DO 2/3

- Afghanistan signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights. The Covenants, adopted by the UNGA in 1966 and implemented in 1976, bind the signees to take steps for progress in assuring a series of rights including life, liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, thought and religion, peaceful assembly, freedom of association and the right to emigrate. States ratifying the Covenants must make periodic reports to the UN Social & Economic Council. Some other states that have signed the Covenants are Bulgaria, Chile, Iran, Libya, Poland, the USSR and Vietnam. UN Press Release

1/25 - Afghan and Soviet troops made a house-to-house search in Mazar-i-Sharif for the 16 kidnapped Soviet advisers. (See 1/3, 2/6) FEER 2/3

- UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar will visit the USSR in March to make a fresh effort to persuade the USSR to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Excerpts from Bernard Nossiter's NYT article follow:

The Secretary General's trip to Moscow will follow a mission to South Asia now in progress by his special representative, Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez, who is trying to negotiate an agreement on the pullout of the 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Mr. Cordovez is required to take at face value the Soviet Union's contention that its troops were invited in by the Afghan Government and so he is barred from direct contact with Moscow.

The Secretary General has been reported as saying that he does not expect Mr. Cordovez to return empty-handed from his current mission. But it is unclear how Mr. Cordovez will gain any accord from the insurgents to sit in a coalition, since they are divided into half a dozen factions and he is barred from talking directly to them.

1/26 - A press conference was held at Freedom House in New York to present eye-witnesses and survivors of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan. Habib-ur-Rahman, Sayed Mortaza and Gol Mohammad, elders of the village of Padkahwab-e-Shana in the Logar Valley, testified that Soviet troops burned their village with chemical incendiaries on 9/3/82. 105 villagers were burned to death. Others testifying were Farida Ahmadi, a medical student who had been tortured, Omar Babrakzai, a lawyer and judge, and A. Ghafoor Yusufzai, a member of the Afghan resistance in the north. The group, brought to the US by the Afghan Relief Committee, visited many cities in the US and met with Senate & House Committees. Michael Barry served as interpreter for the group. Mr. Mohammad gave the following account of the massacre:

In their first appearance at the village since the Soviet intervention in 1979, Soviet soldiers surrounded Padkahwab-e-Shana with tanks at 6 A.M. on Sept. 13; at 7 o'clock helicopters and jets flew over to keep anybody from fleeing.

A total of 105 village residents, all males but including children as young as 6 years, had hidden in an underground irrigation channel near the village square, most of them in fear of being taken into the Government army.

The Soviet soldiers discovered that the villagers were hiding in the canal and demanded that they come out. When nobody did, the soldiers brought over a gasoline tanker and, Mr. Mohammed said, poured "what to me smelled exactly like gasoline" into vertical well shafts that led into the canal.

"Then they brought another vehicle and from this vehicle they poured in a kind of yellowish-white liquid and I don't know what it is," he said. "And then you had men wearing suits and masks and goggles, their heads were completely covered; and they went down the steps leading to the canal entrance and they poured in what looked to us like cement; they poured in a white powder. They poured it into the water."

While Mr. Mohammed and others looked on, the soldiers fired incendiary bullets from AK-47 rifles into the channel, causing what Mr. Mohammed described as an "incredible explosion" and setting the channel afire.

The soldiers remained in the village for several hours. "Then, at 3 o'clock," Mr. Mohammed said, "they burst into applause; they clapped and they gathered their things and just left."

Mr. Mohammed, weeping, said that at that point "You should have seen all the people of the village rushing to the canal because people were saying, 'My father is in there' or 'my child is in there' or 'my brother is in there,' and they started rushing down to see who could be still left alive."

1/27 - Either Babrak Karmal or Sultan Ali Keshtmand will lead the Afghan delegation to the 7th non-aligned summit to be held in Delhi from 3/7-11. "The Afghan government is looking forward to the summit for making fresh efforts for a political settlement to the Afghan situation." DO

2/3 - Commenting on his visits to Islamabad and Kabul, Diego Cordovez said his plans are flexible: "I am an optimist but not a magician." DO

2/6 - Afghan troops raided a guerrilla stronghold in Balkh Province and rescued captured Soviet advisers (see 1/3) according to a Press Trust of India report. FEER

2/9 - A UN press release (SG/1824) stated that Mr. Cordovez informed the Secretary-General that consultations held on his recent trip were "thorough & constructive, with particular emphasis on the formulation of practical provisions - including time-frames - to ensure effective implementation of the settlement."



President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq exchanging views with the visiting Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Diego Cordovez, in Rawalpindi last week. DO 2/3

2/10 - "Mr. Cordovez cannot deal directly with the Soviet Union...but Afghan authorities were assumed to be acting in the talks on behalf of the Soviet Union." Mr. Cordovez has also been barred until now from talking with the Afghan insurgents but he has discussed ways of contacting Afghans in Pakistan. NYT

Freedom House
press release;
NYT (article
by Richard
Bernstein)
1/28

2/10 - John Fullerton reports: "Soviet sources said Moscow is encouraging the Karmal government to take up the refugee issue. Moscow reportedly wants the PDP to suggest establishing a pilot project involving the return of some 5-10,000 Afghan refugees from Pakistan and possible some from Iran. The UN would be invited to monitor their return and the conditions for their resettlement in Afghanistan. Iranian officials are reported to be taking more interest in the progress of the UN sponsored discussions. Tehran's new interest stems from concern over its eastern border; Afghan guerrillas and Iranian security forces have clashed on a minor scale, while in April 1982 ground and air units reportedly fought with Soviet-Afghan hot-pursuit units on Iranian territory." FEER

2/14 - Afghan guerrillas reportedly killed 41 soldiers at the Jalalabad airport last week, bringing to 117 the number of Soviets killed in 3 airport raids in the last 2 months. The raids reportedly destroyed over 30 helicopters. Daily News

- Pakistan Affairs reported that the Chinese donated 3 ambulances from the Chinese Red Cross for use in refugee relief work.

- An Afghan hound won best-in-show at the Westminster Kennel Club's annual show. (See p. 34) NYT

2/17 - A Soviet helicopter reportedly crashed in a residential area of Kabul on 2/4. The pilot was killed and several people on the ground were injured. DO

- The UN Human Rights Commission asked for an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The resolution was sponsored by 22 countries and was passed 29 to 7. There were 5 abstentions. NYT

2/18 - A press release from the Lawyer's Committee for Int'l. Human Rights said that the group had called on US Atty Gen. William French Smith and the Immigration & Naturalization Service to release 36 Afghans from the Brooklyn Detention Center. The Afghans have

been recognized as refugees by the UNHCR and the State Dept's Bureau of Human Rights & Humanitarian Affairs.

- Six men described as deserters from the Soviet army in Afghanistan said on ABC's 20/20 tv program that they were disillusioned with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. "Officers told us that Afghanistan is full of foreign mercenaries and we have to help Afghanistan people fight back the aggression. But this is pure lie... We did not see any aggression here, only Afghanistan people who took arms in their hands to protect their own country." The televised interview was arranged through Freedom House and was conducted by Bill Redeker at an Afghan camp near Kandahar. The six men are from various parts of the USSR; two are from Central Asia. NYT

- French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, meeting Soviet FM Gromyko during a 4-day visit to Moscow spoke of both countries' strategic interests. Regarding Afghanistan, Cheysson said that a political settlement "in conformity with law and reason would, I am sure, have a great effect not only in the region but in the whole world." NYT

2/20 - Diego Cordovez has the approval of Afghanistan & Pakistan to consult Afghan refugees about their conditions for a safe return home. The NYT article by Bernard Nossiter goes on:

"The significance of the agreement, the Western diplomats said, lies in the fact that it is the first time since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan three years ago that the Kabul Government has accepted indirect talks with the Afghan refugees, most of whom have fled to Pakistan."

"Many diplomats, however, remain skeptical of the United Nations effort. The skeptics contend that the Soviet Union has allowed the Kabul Government to give its consent to the negotiations as a demonstration to the third world that Moscow genuinely seeks a solution to the Afghanistan war. Nations in the organization known as the nonaligned movement have been increasingly critical of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan."

"Mr. Cordovez, who holds the rank of an Under Secretary General at the United Nations, must now choose which of the factions he will consult. Then he must get the approval of Afghanistan and Pakistan for his list and also where and how he shall meet them. The diplomats said Mr. Cordovez hopes to win agreement on these critical points at his next round of separate discussions with Afghanistan and Pakistan at Geneva in mid-April."

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Line Drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar
The Chicago Afghanistan Relief
Committee



ABBREVIATIONS USED

DO - Dawn Overseas
CSM - Christian Science Monitor
KNT - Kabul New Times
NYT - New York Times
FEER - Far Eastern Economic Review
AWSJ - Asian Wall Street Journal
WSJ - Wall Street Journal
AICMB - Afghanistan Information Ctr. Monthly Bulletin
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
CC - Central Committee
NFF - National Fatherland Front
NWFP - North West Frontier Province
DYOA - Democratic Youth Organization of
Afghanistan
DRA - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
WDOA - Women's Democratic Organization of
Afghanistan

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